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ABSTRACT
The United States’ commitment to adversarial justice is a defining
feature of its legal system. Standing doctrine, for example, is supposed
to ensure that courts can rely on adverse parties to present the facts
courts need to resolve disputes. Although the U.S. legal system
generally lives up to this adversarial ideal, it sometimes does not.
Appellate courts often look outside the record the parties developed
before the trial court, turning instead to their own independent
research and to factual claims in amicus briefs. This deviation from
the adversarial process is an important respect in which the nation’s
adversarial commitment is more myth than reality. This myth is
problematic for many reasons, including the fact that it obscures the
extent to which some of the most significant cases the Supreme Court
decides, such as Citizens United v. FEC, rely upon “facts” that have
not been subjected to rigorous adversarial testing. The adversarial
myth exists because the U.S. legal system’s current procedures were
designed to address adjudicative facts—facts particularly within the
knowledge of the parties—but many cases turn instead on legislative
facts—more general facts about the state of the world. Recognizing
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this distinction between adjudicative and legislative facts helps identify
those cases in which existing practices undermine, rather than
promote, adversarial justice. This Article concludes with suggestions
for reform, including liberalizing standing doctrine when legislative
facts are at issue. If courts are going to turn to nonparties for help in
resolving disputes of legislative fact, it is better that they be brought
into the process earlier so the factual claims they offer can be
rigorously tested.
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INTRODUCTION
The most dangerous myths are those that are grounded in reality.
The United States’ commitment to an adversarial system of justice is
1
a defining and distinctive feature of its legal system. And although

1. See, e.g., Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 DUKE L.J. 447, 495 (2009) (“[T]he
adversarial system itself is widely acknowledged to be a fundamental feature of the American
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the U.S. legal system generally lives up to this adversarial ideal, there
2
are many cases in which it does not. This Article focuses on one
important respect in which this adversarial commitment is more myth
3
than reality: extra-record factfinding by appellate courts.
4
Older than the country itself, the U.S. legal system’s
commitment to adversarial justice derives from the belief that
5
adversarial testing is the surest route to truth. More than most
6
countries in the world, the United States remains committed to this
ideal, trusting—at least in theory—opposing parties and their zealous
advocates to present the court with all of the information the court
will need to fairly adjudicate the parties’ disputes and determine the
7
proper state of the law. Standing doctrine, which limits the parties
that may bring claims in court, reflects this adversarial ideal and is
routinely justified as a means of “ensur[ing] the proper adversarial

adjudicatory process.”); William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89
GEO. L.J. 371, 371 (2001) (“The traditional premise of American civil adjudication is that ours is
an adversary system . . . .”).
2. See, e.g., Rubenstein, supra note 1, at 371 (“The adversarial model may always have
been more ideal than reality.”).
3. To be sure, this is not the only sense in which the American legal system’s commitment
to an adversarial system of justice sometimes gives way. Surprisingly often, for example, the
Supreme Court will reach out to decide an issue that was not raised by the parties. See, e.g.,
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 931 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (criticizing the majority for “decid[ing] this case on a basis relinquished below, not
included in the questions presented to [the Court] by the litigants, and argued here only in
response to the Court’s invitation”); Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2353 (2009)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for deciding an issue that the parties did not
raise). For good discussions of other situations in which courts often depart from the adversarial
ideal, see generally Frost, supra note 1; and Brian P. Goldman, Note, Should the Supreme Court
Stop Inviting Amici Curiae To Defend Abandoned Lower Court Decisions?, 63 STAN. L. REV.
907 (2011).
4. See, e.g., Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary System,
64 IND. L.J. 301, 323 (1989) (“The starting points for the development of the adversary
system . . . were all in place by the end of the thirteenth century.”).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 908 (5th Cir. 1978) (“Truth is the
essential objective of our adversary system of justice.”).
6. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 382 (1982) (“[O]ur
tradition is considered more adversarial than most . . . .”). See generally ROBERT A. KAGAN,
ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2001) (comparing the American
adversarial system to the legal systems of other nations). But see generally Frank B. Cross,
America the Adversarial, 89 VA. L. REV. 189 (2003) (reviewing KAGAN, supra) (critiquing
Kagan’s conclusions).
7. See Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 386 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (“Our adversary system is designed around the premise that the
parties know what is best for them, and are responsible for advancing the facts and arguments
entitling them to relief.”).
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presentation” of issues, a presentation that facilitates courts’ ability to
8
fairly adjudicate cases. Indeed, trial courts are supposed to resolve
9
cases based on the factual records presented by the parties, and
appellate courts are generally required to defer to district courts’
10
factual findings.
Yet notwithstanding this adversarial ideal, appellate courts often
look outside the record the parties develop before the trial court,
turning instead to their own independent research and to amicus
briefs, even though the resulting factual findings will not have been
11
thoroughly tested by the adversarial process. Chief Justice Roberts
recently illustrated the ease with which judges can engage in
independent research when, during oral argument in a case
challenging the constitutionality of an Arizona campaign finance law,
he noted that he “checked the Citizens’ Clean Elections Commission
12
website [that] morning” to determine the purpose of the statute.
“Why isn’t [the fact that the statute was enacted to ‘level the playing
field’] clear evidence that [the law is] unconstitutional?” he asked the
13
attorney defending the statute. In that case, the attorney had at least
14
some opportunity to respond to the Chief Justice’s research, but in
8. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007).
9. See, e.g., Sharon Finegan, Pro Se Criminal Trials and the Merging of Inquisitorial and
Adversarial Systems of Justice, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 445, 467 (2009) (“A hallmark of the
adversarial system is that the parties control the direction of the trial, with each side
determining what facts to enter in evidence, what witnesses to call, what arguments to make,
and what objections to raise.”); Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity
Procedure, Due Process, and the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L.
REV. 1181, 1187 (2005) (“The adversarial and inquisitorial models are distinguished primarily by
whether the parties or the court control three key aspects of the litigation: initiating the action,
gathering the evidence, and determining the sequence and nature of the proceedings.”).
10. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (“Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other
evidence, must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due
regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.”); Mickens v. Taylor,
535 U.S. 162, 177 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Our role is to defer to the District Court’s
factual findings unless we can conclude they are clearly erroneous.”).
11. See infra Part II.
12. Transcript of Oral Argument at 48, Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v.
Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011) (No. 10-238).
13. Id.
14. The opportunity was hardly complete, however, because Justice Alito interrupted while
the attorney was in the middle of his response to the Chief Justice. See id. (“Well, Mr. Chief
Justice, whatever the Citizens Clean Elections Commission says on its web site I think isn’t
dispositive of what the voters of Arizona had in mind when they passed this initiative. The
Court—this Court has recognized since Buckley that public financing serves a valid
anticorruption purpose, and it does so because it eliminates the influence of private
contributions on the candidates who take public financing. And it—”).
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many cases, the parties will not know—and thus cannot respond—
when judges engage in independent research. Moreover, page
limitations on briefs, time constraints on oral argument, and the
general opacity of the appellate process may prevent thorough
adversarial testing of the factual claims presented in amicus briefs.
This reliance on extra-record facts that have not been thoroughly
tested by the adversarial process helps contribute to what I describe
as the “adversarial myth,” a commitment to adversarial justice that
appellate courts espouse as a matter of theory but often fail to realize
in practice.
The tension between myth and reality is pervasive. Consider, for
example, the litigation surrounding Proposition 8, a state-wide ballot
15
initiative passed in California to ban same-sex marriage. Opponents
of the ban rushed to court to challenge it, arguing that it violated the
16
Fourteenth Amendment. In the process of concluding that
Proposition 8 was unconstitutional, the district court made substantial
factual findings, detailing—in roughly fifty pages—over eighty
separate findings related to same-sex marriage and its effect on
17
children raised by same-sex couples.
Some commentators hailed these factual findings, explaining that
they—like most trial court factual findings—would be entitled to
deference on appeal. For example, a prominent law professor
observes that:
District courts . . . get to establish the facts. And appellate courts,
because they don’t get to see the witnesses and assess their
credibility, are supposed to accept the facts as the trial court found
them.

15. The initiative actually overturned an earlier California Supreme Court decision
recognizing a right to same-sex marriage under the California constitution. See In re Marriage
Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 401 (Cal. 2008) (“[W]e conclude that the purpose underlying differential
treatment of opposite-sex and same-sex couples embodied in California’s current marriage
statutes—the interest in retaining the traditional and well-established definition of marriage—
cannot properly be viewed as a compelling state interest for purposes of the equal protection
clause, or as necessary to serve such an interest.”).
16. See, e.g., Bob Egelko, Legal Challenges: Same-Sex Issue Back in High Court, S.F.
CHRON., Nov. 6, 2008, at A19 (reporting that the California attorney general would defend the
legality of marriages that occurred in the time span prior to the passage of Proposition 8).
17. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 953–91 (N.D. Cal.), appeal pending, No.
10-16696, 2010 WL 3212786 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2010).
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So if the Supreme Court reverses the district court’s decision that
same-sex couples have a right to marry, it will have to do it in the
18
teeth of [the district court judge’s] factual findings . . . .

Notwithstanding these commentators’ observations, the reality is
that nothing in the current legal framework prevents a higher court
from looking outside the record created by the parties and relying on
its own factual findings to reverse the trial court’s decision.
The adversarial myth suggests that such extra-record appellate
court factfinding does not happen. It suggests that adversarial parties
provide courts with all of the information they need to resolve legal
disputes and that appellate courts need only rely on the factual
findings made by trial courts based on the presentation of the parties.
19
Yet the myth is not reality; instead, it obscures reality by hiding the
pervasiveness of extra-record appellate court factfinding. Indeed,
because the adversarial myth hides the extent to which appellate
courts, particularly the Supreme Court, engage in extra-record
factfinding, there has been little attention paid to the fact that no
regularized practices and procedures exist to govern such factfinding.
Unlike facts found by trial courts, which are subjected to adversarial
testing, facts found by appellate courts are generally subjected to no
testing at all. This failure to meaningfully test the facts underlying
judicial decisions undermines both the legitimacy of the judicial
process and the results of that process. After all, appellate courts’
failure to rigorously test their factual findings can undermine the
quality of those findings, even though such findings are often critical
20
to the courts’ ultimate legal conclusions.
Standing doctrine ostensibly ensures adherence to the
adversarial ideal and prevents extra-record appellate court
factfinding. By allowing only adverse parties who have the incentives
to present courts with all of the information required to bring claims

18. Andrew Koppelman, Power in the Facts, N.Y. TIMES ROOM FOR DEBATE (Aug. 4,
2010, 10:03 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/8/4/gay-marriage-and-theconstitution/judge-walkers-factual-findings; see also Dahlia Lithwick, A Brilliant Ruling, SLATE
(Aug. 4, 2010, 9:27 PM ET), http://www.slate.com/id/2262766 (“Then come the elaborate
‘findings of fact’—and recall that appellate courts must defer far more to a judge’s findings of
fact than conclusions of law.”).
19. See infra notes 105–135 and accompanying text.
20. The familiar adage that “bad facts make bad law” reflects the reality that facts often
play a critical role in shaping the development of the law. See, e.g., Doggett v. United States, 505
U.S. 647, 659 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Just as ‘bad facts make bad law,’ so too odd facts
make odd law.”).

GOROD IN PRINTER PROOF

2011]

10/6/2011 6:57:08 PM

THE ADVERSARIAL MYTH

7

in court, standing doctrine is supposed to prevent courts from having
21
to look outside the record developed by the parties. Yet current
standing doctrine often prohibits institutional players—such as the
ACLU or the Washington Legal Foundation—from participating as
22
parties in cases, even when those organizations have the expertise
and resources to provide the courts with the information necessary to
resolve factual disputes relevant to the legal claims at issue and
23
individual plaintiffs do not. Ironically, appellate courts often rely on
factual claims in the amicus briefs filed by these organizations, even
though standing doctrine prevents those organizations from bringing
cases directly and from meaningfully participating in the development
of the factual record before the trial court—the forum in which
24
factual claims are supposed to be tested.

21. See, e.g., Stephan Landsman, A Brief Survey of the Development of the Adversary
System, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 713, 714–15 (1983) (“The adversary system relies on a neutral and
passive decision maker to adjudicate disputes that have been aired by the adversaries in a
contested proceeding. He . . . is prohibited from becoming actively involved in the gathering of
evidence or in the parties’ settlement of the case. . . . Intimately connected with the
requirements of decision-maker passivity and neutrality is the procedural principle that the
parties are responsible for production of all the evidence upon which the decision will be
based.”).
22. See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1147, 1153 (2009) (denying
standing to “a group of organizations dedicated to protecting the environment”).
23. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the
Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 891–92 (1983) (“Often the very best
adversaries are national organizations such as the NAACP or the American Civil Liberties
Union that have a keen interest in the abstract question at issue in the case, but no ‘concrete
injury in fact’ whatever. Yet the doctrine of standing clearly excludes them, unless they can
attach themselves to some particular individual who happens to have some personal interest
(however minor) at stake.”); cf. Lino A. Graglia, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye: Of Animal
Sacrifice and Religious Persecution, 85 GEO. L.J. 1, 28 (1996) (“The ACLU, the paradigmatic
constitutional litigator of our times, came to [the aid of an individual facing religious
discrimination], providing the funds and expertise to institute litigation against the city and
prosecute it to success in the nation’s highest court.”). As the last example illustrates, the ACLU
and similar organizations will sometimes help provide courts with the information they need by
serving as attorneys, rather than parties, in cases. Indeed, this is how some of the most
significant legal advances in the nation’s history have occurred. See, e.g., Genna Rae McNeil,
Before Brown: Reflections on Historical Context and Vision, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1431, 1447–60
(2003) (discussing the “litigation campaign of the NAACP” that “culminat[ed]” in Brown v.
Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955)). But there are many other cases in which such
organizations might be in the best position to provide the court with relevant information, yet
do not become involved until litigation is well underway and factual development is, in theory,
complete.
24. See infra note 89.
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Although it is perhaps unsurprising that courts sometimes rely on
25
extra-record facts, it is surprising that the phenomenon has received
so little attention, given that it results in important factual disputes
being decided by appellate courts, without the benefit of meaningful
adversarial testing. The Supreme Court itself rarely acknowledges the
practice and has made virtually no effort to square its practice of
looking outside the record with its purported commitment to an
26
adversarial system of justice. Commentators, too, have largely
ignored the issue. Although scholars have explored and debated the
27
significance of amicus briefs to Supreme Court decisionmaking, they

25. It is not difficult to conceive of reasons why courts might want to look outside the
record developed by the parties. The parties’ attorneys may fail to adequately present the
relevant facts to the district court, or the appellate court may want to justify an outcome that
was unsupported by the existing record.
26. When a Supreme Court Justice does reference the practice, it is generally because his
was not the majority position and he thinks that his colleagues inappropriately engaged in extrarecord factfinding to reach their result. See, e.g., Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2286
(2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Supreme Court briefs are an inappropriate place to develop the
key facts in a case. We normally give parties more robust protection, leaving important factual
questions to district courts and juries aided by expert witnesses and the procedural protections
of discovery.”); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 391–92 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(“Neither the majority nor the lengthy dissent in [the Kansas Supreme Court] referred to the
two facts that the majority now seizes upon, and for good reason. That court denied a motion to
take judicial notice of the state habeas proceeding. The proceeding is thus not part of the
record, and cannot properly be considered by this Court. . . . The prohibition on facts found
outside the record is designed to ensure the reliability of the evidence before the Court.”
(citation omitted)); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 512 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (criticizing
the Court for going “outside the record” to determine that Connecticut had stopped enforcing
its anticontraceptive law).
27. See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Amicus Curiae Before the Supreme
Court: Who Participates, When, and How Much?, 52 J. POL. 782 (1990) (discussing the
participation of certain groups as amici curiae); Paul M. Collins Jr., Friends of the Court:
Examining the Influence of Amicus Curiae Participation in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation, 38
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 807 (2004) (hypothesizing why amicus briefs might prove successful); Lee
Epstein & Jack Knight, Mapping Out the Strategic Terrain: The Informational Role of Amici
Curiae, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 215
(Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999) (comparing the role of amici curiae for
Justices to the role of lobbyists for legislators); Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The
Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743 (2000)
(considering the increase in amicus briefs and their impact on the Supreme Court); Kelly J.
Lynch, Best Friends? Supreme Court Law Clerks on Effective Amicus Curiae Briefs, 20 J.L. &
POL. 33 (2004) (reporting on interviews with Supreme Court clerks and their perspectives on
amicus briefs); Kevin T. McGuire, Amici Curiae and Strategies for Gaining Access to the
Supreme Court, 47 POL. RES. Q. 821 (1994) (examining the reasons that lawyers seek contact
with amici curiae); Karen O’Connor & Lee Epstein, Amicus Curiae Participation in U.S.
Supreme Court Litigation: An Appraisal of Hakman’s “Folklore,” 16 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 311
(1981) (criticizing early research on the impact of amicus briefs); James F. Spriggs, II & Paul J.
Wahlbeck, Amicus Curiae and the Role of Information at the Supreme Court, 50 POL. RES. Q.
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have not answered the more fundamental question of why it is even
appropriate for the Court to look to these briefs—presented by
28
nonparties, after all—for factual claims.
This resort to extra-record factfinding is problematic because it
means that appellate courts often rest their decisions on facts that
have not been subjected to the kind of rigorous testing that the
country’s adversarial system is supposed to ensure—or, in many
cases, to any testing at all. In a world in which the relevant facts were
all uncontestable (for example, the sky is blue, and the capital of the
United States is Washington, D.C.), the courts’ approach might be
unproblematic—or at least much less problematic. But, in fact, people
can reasonably disagree about many relevant “facts” about how the
29
world works. In such a world, the fact that a credible treatise
presents one way of looking at the world (for example, a particular
view of the economic effects of a merger or the environmental
consequences of a particular action) does not mean that there are not
other credible treatises that present alternative ways of looking at it.
Given this indeterminacy, it is problematic when such “facts” are
“found” by ad hoc methods without the benefit of rigorous testing
and then provide the basis for consequential legal decisions.
Appellate courts’ tendency to resort to extra-record facts
presented by nonparties has developed because standing doctrine and
365 (1997) (arguing that amicus curiae briefs help the Justices gauge the impact of their
opinions).
28. One could argue, of course, that looking at amicus briefs for any reason is inconsistent
with the adversarial ideal and with standing requirements. See Rebecca Haw, Amicus Briefs and
the Sherman Act: Why Antitrust Needs a New Deal, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1247, 1250–55 (2011) (“[A]
narrow reading of Article III’s cases and controversies requirement would make this
participation of amici impossible, since under that clause only parties with a justiciable dispute
can petition a court for redress.”). That is not my claim here, and indeed, some have argued that
“[a] decision forbidding the courts’ consideration of legal theories not raised by the litigants
would cast doubt on the rule of law.” Neal Devins, Asking the Right Questions: How the Courts
Honored the Separation of Powers by Reconsidering Miranda, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 251, 280
(2000). Here, I am making the more limited claim that the use of amicus briefs to develop the
factual record is inconsistent with the adversarial system and, at least in the unconsidered
manner in which such reliance currently occurs, problematic.
29. To be sure, the word “fact” suggests objectivity and certainty, but appearances are
often deceiving. Many so-called “facts” are the subject of significant empirical dispute, and the
line between “fact” and “interpretation” is often fuzzy. See, e.g., Judith Lichtenberg, The Will to
Truth: A Reply to Novick, 560 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 43, 46 (1998)
(“[E]xplanation of fact . . . appears to be a matter of interpretation.”). Philosophical questions
about the meaning—and even existence—of “facts” are beyond the scope of this Article, but
what is important is acknowledging that many “facts” are contestable. Recognizing that this is
so explains why it is so important that “facts” be tested and considered before they become the
basis for legal conclusions.
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the courts’ procedures governing factual development were designed
to address a certain kind of fact—specifically, the kind of fact that is
particular to the parties before the court. In the existing literature,
these kinds of facts are known as adjudicative facts, and they have
been distinguished from legislative facts, more general facts about the
state of the world that are not particularly within the knowledge of
30
the parties with standing to appear before the court.
Recognizing the distinction between adjudicative and legislative
facts helps explain the existence of the adversarial myth, as well as
why it tends to be especially problematic in some of the most
consequential cases the U.S. legal system decides. In cases in which
the court is applying settled law to a dispute involving adjudicative
facts, it makes sense to strictly limit who can bring the claim, to rely
on those parties to develop the factual record, and to require
appellate courts to defer to such factual findings on review. In doing
so, the courts rely on the parties with the most knowledge of the
facts—and the parties most affected by the court’s factual findings—
to present them to the court. But practices and procedures developed
for adjudicative facts make less sense—and may generally work less
well—when legislative facts are at issue. After all, legislative facts,
unlike adjudicative facts, will generally help the court decide
contested issues of law in a way that will affect parties beyond those
31
before the court. And when legislative facts are at issue, there is no
reason to think that the parties before the court are particularly well
suited to developing the factual record. Indeed, the fact that appellate
courts so often go outside the record developed by the trial court
32
based on the parties’ presentation suggests that this is the case.
To be sure, the parties may sometimes do a good job presenting
legislative facts, and it is certainly in their interest to do so. But in
many cases, they will not do a good job because they do not have the
expertise or the resources to gather the relevant evidence. Moreover,
even if they could do a good job, they might not do as good a job as

30. See infra Part III.A.
31. See infra notes 167–184 and accompanying text.
32. Appellate courts may sometimes “find” adjudicative facts that the parties do not
present, see, e.g., United States v. Boyd, 475 F.3d 875, 878 (7th Cir. 2007) (Posner, J.) (“We are,
however, distressed at the sloppiness with which the case has been handled by both
sides. . . . [N]o satellite photo (available free of charge from Google) was placed in evidence to
indicate the physical surroundings [at the scene of the crime].”), but more often when appellate
courts find facts that were not presented by the parties below, they will be “legislative” in
nature, see infra Part III.A.
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could the broader array of individuals and organizations that may also
have an interest when legislative fact issues are being resolved.
Thus, adjudicative facts—the resolution of which will generally
affect only the immediate parties before the court—are found by trial
courts using procedures designed to ensure rigorous adversarial
testing, whereas legislative facts—the resolution of which will often
affect far more individuals—are often subjected to no testing at all.
And the unacknowledged way in which courts currently deviate from
established practices when legislative facts are at issue makes rigorous
testing of such facts even less likely. That legislative facts are
generally most critical in cases likely to have a more widespread effect
on society only increases the significance of the problem.
In this Article, I offer some preliminary thoughts on how to
address the problem of extra-record appellate court factfinding. Most
significantly, I argue that courts should rethink current restrictions on
standing doctrine. If courts will ultimately turn to nonparties to
provide them with the legislative facts they need to decide the case,
those parties should be brought into the process at the trial court
level, so that the legislative facts they offer can be thoroughly tested.
Toward that end, courts should also adopt practices for finding
legislative facts that will improve the quality of their factfinding and
their ability to transparently present the factual foundations for their
decisions. There are several possible ways in which the federal system
might do this—perhaps by establishing magistrates who specialize in
legislative factfinding or a special research service to assist the
33
courts.
Whatever the ultimate answer, appellate courts should, in the
meantime, remand to the trial courts when they are facing an
inadequate factual record. Trial courts, with the assistance of both the
parties and invited amici, can facilitate the kind of adversarial testing
of legislative facts that the current system rarely provides.
In Part I of this Article, I explore how the American legal
system’s faith in the adversarial system manifests itself in the courts’
doctrine and practices. I focus on standing doctrine and the treatment
of factual development by courts as two examples of the more general
33. Although such tools may be no more adversarial than the status quo, they would, in
theory, provide more meaningful assurances of the quality of the resulting factual findings than
currently exist. My point, after all, is not that adversarial testing is the only means by which
factual findings can be developed, but simply that the assumption that the factual findings in
appellate court opinions are currently being subjected to such testing is often misplaced. It is
important to recognize the myth and then to think broadly about possible means to address it.
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phenomenon by which American courts claim to rely on adversarial
parties to improve the quality of judicial decisionmaking.
In Part II, I expose this faith as a myth by discussing the repeated
failure of courts to adhere to this adversarial ideal. Specifically, I
explore numerous examples of appellate courts choosing not to rely
on the facts developed by the parties and instead looking outside the
record for the facts on which they will ultimately rest their decisions. I
follow this anecdotal evidence with a discussion of one formalized
mechanism by which appellate courts—and particularly the Supreme
Court—invite nonparties to provide extra-record facts: the amicus
brief.
In Part III, I explore the source of this tension—namely, that the
adversarial system and the rules that go with it were designed for
adjudicative facts and make much less sense in the context of
legislative facts. Resolving disputes about legislative facts is often an
essential part of the task of judging, but courts’ unwillingness to
acknowledge this aspect of their role leads them to ignore the fact
that they are resolving these kinds of factual questions.
In Part IV, I explain why this disconnect is problematic, focusing
on four consequences in particular: (a) the courts’ reliance on
unfounded assumptions, rather than tested facts; (b) the lack of
established guidelines for the development and testing of legislative
facts; (c) the lack of transparency about courts’ rationales in judicial
opinions; and (d) the entrenchment in law of factual claims that
should be subject to reconsideration as the world—and one’s means
of understanding it—changes. I also raise the larger question of
whether a court structure that was designed for private adversarial
disputes that turn on adjudicative facts makes as much sense for more
public claims that turn instead on legislative facts.
Finally, in Part V, I provide some preliminary thoughts on how
to address these problems. In particular, I argue that the current
restrictions on standing doctrine should be reconsidered because
allowing more parties into the process earlier may accomplish what
standing has not: a complete record for court decisions. I also argue
that rules and practices are needed to guide the development of
legislative facts. The U.S. legal system has largely taken shape around
the adversarial myth; when there is a disconnect between myth and
reality—as there is in the context of legislative facts—it is time to
figure out how best to bring the two into alignment.
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I. UNDERSTANDING THE MYTH
As I have noted, the American legal system is grounded in a
commitment to an adversarial system of justice, one that relies on
opposing parties to provide the court with the information and the
arguments that it needs to decide both the meaning of the law and
34
how it should apply in particular cases. Even if this vision of an
adversarial system is in many respects a myth that imperfectly
captures the work of the courts, the commitment to this ideal
pervades the whole of the American legal system—manifesting itself
in both the cases the system considers and the processes by which it
resolves them.
But the American legal system does not value adversarial
competition simply for adversarial competition’s own sake, nor does
the system value it simply for the instrumental benefits it might seem
35
to offer over alternative models. Rather, the adversarial ideal is
inextricably connected to the popular view that courts should play a
limited role in a democratic society; it both ensures that courts do not
exceed their proper role and provides them with a means of filling
36
that role well. I begin by discussing the traditional understanding of
the proper role of courts in a democratic society and then explain how
adversarialism advances that role. Finally, I show the importance of
this ideal by discussing how it dictates a significant aspect of court
37
practice and procedure.

34. See supra notes 4–7 and accompanying text.
35. See, e.g., David Alan Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1634, 1670
(2009) (noting the argument “that the adversary system is simply better than the inquisitorial
system—better at finding the truth, or better at protecting individual rights, or better at
guarding against abuses of power, or better at some combination of those tasks”—and
recognizing that “[t]here are hints of this argument . . . in certain decisions of the Supreme
Court”).
36. See infra Part I.B.
37. I should note at the outset that the purpose of this Article is not to engage with the
comprehensive literature on the strengths and weaknesses of an adversarial system of justice,
especially as compared to other comparative models. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The German
Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 824 (1985) (“[T]he familiar contrast
between our adversarial procedure and the supposedly nonadversarial procedure of the
Continental tradition has been grossly overdrawn.”). My point is simply that the U.S. legal
system is, in its essential attributes, an adversarial one—and yet it departs from that adversarial
commitment in ways that deserve greater attention than they have heretofore received.
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38

Although there may be no statement in legal discourse that is
more quoted than Chief Justice Marshall’s famous conclusion (and
39
premise) in Marbury v. Madison that “[i]t is emphatically the
40
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,”
this statement is at odds with what the primary “duty of the judicial
department” is typically understood to be—namely, to resolve private
41
disputes between individual litigants. In fulfilling this role, courts
consider the evidence and listen to the arguments presented by
individual litigants and then issue decisions binding only those

38. Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 866 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.).
39. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
40. Id. at 177.
41. See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353,
357 (1978) (“The normal occasion for a resort to adjudication is when parties are at odds with
one another, often to such a degree that a breach of social order is threatened.”). Of course, the
nature of adjudication has shifted over time as courts have become more involved in litigation
raising public-law claims. See Chris H. Miller, The Adaptive American Judiciary: From Classical
Adjudication to Class Action Litigation, 72 ALB. L. REV. 117, 129 (2009) (“[T]he courts have
traditionally dealt with private disputes between two parties, then moved to large public-type
disputes, and currently involve themselves in a great deal of aggregated private disputes.”
(footnotes omitted)); see also Robert L. Tsai, Conceptualizing Constitutional Litigation as AntiGovernment Expression: A Speech-Centered Theory of Court Access, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 835, 837
n.2 (2002) (discussing the development of “two distinctive models of adjudication:” the
“traditional or ‘dispute resolution’ model[, which] centers on the resolution of controversies that
involve only the interests of those immediately before the court,” and the “public law model of
legal decision-making[, which] focuses on vindicating public values, including constitutional
principles, and has a unique forward-looking character”). Indeed, courts’ roles in resolving such
controversies may have contributed to the adversarial myth. As the courts have moved toward
resolving more public-law issues, more cases may have arisen in which the parties are ill suited
to presenting all of the relevant facts and in which courts, as a consequence, have looked outside
the record to facts presented by nonparties. Cf. Rachel N. Pine, Speculation and Reality: The
Role of Facts in Judicial Protection of Fundamental Rights, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 655, 660–61
(1988) (“[The] legitimation of change in the law and of courts as the locus for testing legal
principles against empirical observation and the social welfare opened the door to an expanded
role for facts in the judicial process and particularly in constitutional adjudication.” (footnote
omitted)). Technological innovation, such as the advent of the Internet, may also have
accelerated this departure from the adversarial ideal. After all, although judges certainly
engaged in independent research before the Internet, see, e.g., Arthur Selwyn Miller & Jerome
A. Barron, The Supreme Court, the Adversary System, and the Flow of Information to the
Justices: A Preliminary Inquiry, 61 VA. L. REV. 1187, 1215–16 (1975) (“[Justices]
conduct . . . independent research; they send their law clerks scurrying through the libraries and
elsewhere . . . to add to the totality of knowledge about the social issues that they must decide as
lawyers.”), there can be no doubt that the Internet has made such independent research far
easier, see supra notes 12–13.
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42

parties. It is black-letter law that individuals who did not have an
43
opportunity to be heard cannot be bound by a court’s judgment.
To be sure, in the context of resolving private disputes, courts
will, at times, make more general statements about the law,
statements that will have an impact on individuals other than the
44
parties before them. Although such general statements may be an
45
inevitable—and even beneficial—part of judging, the fact that they
are always made in the context of litigation between adverse parties is
supposed to ensure that courts do not exceed their limited role in a
46
democratic society. After all, the primary role of the courts is to
apply the law; responsibility for making the law rests with elected
legislators who are better positioned, both institutionally and as a
matter of democratic theory, to choose among competing policy
47
positions and values.
42. See, e.g., R.R. Co. v. Nat’l Bank, 102 U.S. 14, 21 (1880) (“Personal judgments bind only
parties and their privies.”).
43. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n.7 (1979) (“It is a violation
of due process for a judgment to be binding on a litigant who was not a party or a privy and
therefore has never had an opportunity to be heard.”).
44. Statements in cases can affect individuals other than the parties before them because
such statements become law that either guides or binds subsequent courts addressing similar
issues. See generally Charles W. Collier, Precedent and Legal Authority: A Critical History, 1988
WIS. L. REV. 771 (sketching out “a general theory of precedent and legal authority through
historical sources”).
45. See Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings, 83 N.C. L. REV.
847, 917 (2005) (“[U]nless a court simply repeats the facts of a case and announces a judgment,
its decision will almost always resolve other cases not before the court. . . . Yet most of us do not
object to the articulation of general principles by courts. To the contrary, we believe that
reliance on general principles promotes the rule of law and prevents judges from deciding cases
based on personal bias.”).
46. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 103 (1978)
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (“We are not statesmen; we are judges. When it is
necessary to resolve a constitutional issue in the adjudication of an actual case or controversy, it
is our duty to do so. But whenever we are persuaded by reasons of expediency to engage in the
business of giving legal advice, we chip away a part of the foundation of our independence and
our strength.”); Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. S.S. Co. v. Comm’rs of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39
(1885) (“[The Court] has no jurisdiction to pronounce any statute, either of a State or of the
United States, void, because irreconcilable with the Constitution, except as it is called upon to
adjudge the legal rights of litigants in actual controversies.”); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Injury and the
Disintegration of Article III, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1915, 1920 (1986) (“It is a judge’s obligation to
decide private disputes. If, as part of that process, interpretation of the constitutionality of
statutes is required, so be it. The trigger of judicial power, however, is the protection of private
rights.”).
47. See, e.g., Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial, Legislative, and Administrative Lawmaking: A
Proposed Research Service for the Supreme Court, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1986) (“I believe
that both legislative lawmaking and administrative lawmaking are superior to judicial
lawmaking in three main ways: (1) The product is better in clarity, reliability, and freedom from
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This view of the proper role of the courts has given rise to a
number of doctrines intended to ensure that courts do not breach
these limits on their role. Whether limiting the type of claim that can
48
49
50
be brought, who can bring a claim, or when, these doctrines all
embody “an idea, which is more than an intuition but less than a
rigorous and explicit theory, about the constitutional and prudential
limits to the powers of an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in our
51
52
kind of government.” Much has been written about these doctrines,
but what is important for present purposes is that they all serve—and
are served by—the myth of the adversarial system of justice: by
asserting that courts can only decide concrete and active disputes,
they contribute to the notion that the role of the courts is not to make
law, but rather to apply it in the context of resolving disputes between
adversarial parties.
In the next Section, I focus on one of these doctrines—
standing—and discuss the respects in which it, and the adversity it is
supposed to ensure, helps maintain the proper role of the courts.
Although the Court’s framing of standing doctrine and its
requirements has evolved over time, standing has always been
designed to protect, implicitly or otherwise, the proper role of the
conflict; (2) the legislative process and the administrative process are more democratic than the
judicial process; and (3) the factual base for legislation and for administrative rules is normally
much stronger than the factual base for judge-made law.”).
48. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277 (2004) (plurality opinion)
(“Sometimes . . . the judicial department has no business entertaining the claim of
unlawfulness—because the question is entrusted to one of the political branches or involves no
judicially enforceable rights. Such questions are said to be ‘nonjusticiable,’ or ‘political
questions.’” (citations omitted)).
49. See infra notes 57–62 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148–49 (1967) (describing a “basic
rationale” of ripeness doctrine as “prevent[ing] the courts, through avoidance of premature
adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative
policies”).
51. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (quoting Vander Jagt v. O’Neill, 699 F.2d
1166, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Bork, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (noting that these doctrines are “founded in concern
about the proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic society”).
52. For discussions of the various justiciability doctrines, see, for example, Raoul Berger,
Standing To Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969);
Louis L. Jaffe, Standing To Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1265
(1961); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J.
1363 (1973); Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEX. L. REV. 73 (2007); Cass R.
Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan?: Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L.
REV. 163 (1992); and Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of SelfGovernance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988).
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53

courts. First, by requiring adverse parties, standing doctrine attempts
to ensure that courts are deciding concrete disputes, not abstract
54
questions of policy. Second, by requiring adverse parties with the
incentive to zealously litigate the case, standing doctrine ensures that
55
courts have the facts they need to properly resolve legal disputes.
Courts need such assistance precisely because of their limited role in
society: they, unlike legislatures, have no other means of finding the
56
facts that will provide the foundations for their decisions. Or so the
theory goes.
B. Standing and the Adversarial Myth
Federal courts are defined as much by what cases they decide as
by how they decide them. Standing doctrine, which limits which
57
parties may bring claims in court, plays a key role in determining
58
what cases the federal courts decide. As it is currently formulated,
standing doctrine provides that a plaintiff is the “proper party” to sue
only if he “allege[s] personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s
allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the
59
requested relief.” Related to, but distinct from, this standing
requirement, which the Court has identified as an “irreducible
60
constitutional minimum,” the doctrine of “prudential standing”
recognizes various “judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of
61
federal jurisdiction,” all of which are intended to ensure that the
courts do not inadvertently enter into disputes that are more properly
62
left to the other branches.

53. See infra notes 67–70 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 67–69 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 71–76 and accompanying text.
56. See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004) (“In every
federal case, the party bringing the suit must establish standing to prosecute the action.”).
58. Standing doctrine arguably derives from the Constitution’s extension of “[t]he judicial
Power” to “Cases” and “Controversies,” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1, although there is much
controversy about whether standing doctrine is constitutionally required, see infra note 295 and
accompanying text.
59. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751
(1984) (emphasis added)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Newdow, 542 U.S. at 12
(describing these basic elements as “familiar”).
60. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
61. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 11 (quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at 751) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
62. Id. at 12.

GOROD IN PRINTER PROOF

18

10/6/2011 6:57:08 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:1

The ins and outs of the development of standing doctrine are less
important than the interests the doctrine is designed to serve. The
Court has stated that standing “is built on a single basic idea—the
63
idea of separation of powers.” But the “idea of separation of
powers” is neither singular nor basic. To the contrary, there are
64
several concepts implicit in the idea of “separation of powers.”
Professor Heather Elliott points to three in particular, one of which is
particularly relevant here: “ensur[ing] that a particular plaintiff has a
sufficient stake in the controversy he brings before the court to justify
65
the court’s action.”
This function—the “concrete-adversity function,” as Elliott
describes it—“ensures that the federal courts hear only those disputes
characterized by the kind of adversary relationship that makes a legal
66
‘case’ or a ‘controversy.’” In this respect, both standing doctrine and
adverse parties help ensure that the courts do not act as legislatures,
making general rules of policy. Instead, courts limit their role to
67
resolving concrete disputes between adverse litigants. As the
Supreme Court has explained, “The Art. III judicial power exists only
to redress or otherwise to protect against injury to the complaining
68
party.” The role of the courts is not to “decide abstract questions of
69
wide public significance.”
Standing doctrine not only helps define the limits of the courts’
role, but also recognizes that because of courts’ limited role, judges
need the assistance of adverse parties to provide them with the
70
information and arguments necessary to reach the proper result.
63. Allen, 468 U.S. at 752.
64. Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 460 (2008).
65. Id. at 468. Professor Elliott’s other two ideas are “prevent[ing] the federal courts from
engaging in decisions that are better made by the political branches” and limiting the ability of
Congress to “conscript[] the courts to fight its battles against the executive branch.” Id.
66. Id.; see also id. at 469 (noting that such disputes are quintessentially appropriate for
judicial resolution because they involve the adjudication of “the legal rights of litigants in actual
controversies” (quoting Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. S.S. Co. v. Comm’rs of Emigration, 113 U.S.
33, 39 (1885) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
67. Id. at 470; cf. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–60 (1992) (“[T]he
Constitution’s central mechanism of separation of powers depends largely upon common
understanding of what activities are appropriate to legislatures, to executives, and to courts.”).
68. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
69. Id. at 500; see also Scalia, supra note 23, at 881 (“My thesis is that the judicial doctrine
of standing is a crucial and inseparable element of that principle, whose disregard will inevitably
produce . . . an overjudicialization of the processes of self-governance.”).
70. See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism, 74 VA. L. REV. 519,
552 (1988) (“[C]ourts are limited in their ability to investigate issues on the periphery of those
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This latter idea—that the parties’ adverseness “promotes better
71
litigation” —is regularly invoked in the Court’s discussions of
72
73
standing. In Massachusetts v. EPA, for example, the Court
emphasized this aspect of standing doctrine when it explained,
“‘[T]he gist of the question of standing’ is whether petitioners have
‘such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
74
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination.’”
Requiring
the party bringing suit [to] show that the action injures him in a
concrete and personal way . . . preserves the vitality of the
adversarial process by assuring . . . that the legal questions
presented . . . will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a
debating society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a
75
realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial action.

brought to them by the litigants, or even to explore the issues before them in any more detail
than the parties wish to provide. . . . Nor could the court easily obtain the views of those most
affected by the present practice and the proposed change. These ‘legislative facts’ are
appropriately named; legislatures are better equipped to obtain them than are courts, both
because of the scope of their investigative powers and because of the resources at their
command.” (footnote omitted)).
71. Elliott, supra note 64, at 470.
72. Id.; see also id. at 471 (“The rhetoric of these cases . . . links standing to good judicial
decision making.”). Standing is not the only doctrine that links adversity to the quality of
judicial decisionmaking. Courts, for example, regularly decline to follow statements in prior
cases because such statements are merely dicta and therefore are not binding on subsequent
courts. United States v. Crawley, 837 F.2d 291, 292 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J.) (identifying dicta
as “the part of an opinion that a later court, even if it is an inferior court, is free to reject”). As
Judge Richard Posner has explained, one reason for a court not to give dicta weight is that “the
issue addressed in the passage was not presented as an issue [and] hence was not refined by the
fires of adversary presentation.” Id. at 293; see also Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the
Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249, 1261 (2006) (“Our readiness to trust a
court’s rulings of law depends on the assumption that the adverse parties will each vigorously
assert the best defense of its positions. The court reaches its decision only after confronting
conflicting arguments powerfully advanced by both sides.”).
73. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
74. Id. at 517 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)); see also Camreta v.
Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2028 (2011) (noting that the “opposing party” in a case must “have an
ongoing interest in the dispute, so that the case features ‘that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues’” (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101
(1983))).
75. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 517 (third omission in original) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 581 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (internal quotation marks omitted)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S.
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As the Court has further explained, the plaintiff’s
personal stake . . . enables a complainant authoritatively to present
to a court a complete perspective upon the adverse consequences
flowing from the specific set of facts undergirding his grievance.
Such authoritative presentations are an integral part of the judicial
process, for a court must rely on the parties’ treatment of the facts
76
and claims before it to develop its rules of law.

Thus, the commitment to adversarialism purportedly serves two
purposes, both reflected in the Court’s discussions of standing
doctrine: it helps ensure that courts are only in the business of
resolving narrow disputes, while at the same time ensuring that they
have the information necessary to resolve those disputes well.
To be sure, as I noted at the outset, adverseness is not the only
77
justification the Court has offered for standing doctrine, and it has at
78
times placed more emphasis on other rationales. Indeed, the very
464, 472 (1982) (noting that the standing requirement of an “actual injury redressable by the
court” tends to ensure that legal questions presented in court have a concrete factual context).
76. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. To Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221 (1974); see also id.
(“Only concrete injury presents the factual context within which a court, aided by parties who
argue within the context, is capable of making decisions.”); see also United States v. Richardson,
418 U.S. 166, 191 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) (lamenting the liberalization of standing
requirements because he feared it would result in “issues . . . be[ing] presented in abstract
form”). In the context of prudential limitations on standing, the Court has similarly invoked the
courts’ interest in “assur[ing] that the most effective advocate of the rights at issue is present to
champion them.” Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978).
77. See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (“Though some of its elements express merely
prudential considerations that are part of judicial self-government, the core component of
standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article
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lack of consistency in the Court’s justifications might suggest that the
frequent rhetoric about the link between adversity and good judicial
decisionmaking is just that—rhetoric and nothing more. But
regardless of whether members of the Court in fact believe that
standing doctrine exists to ensure adversity and to promote quality
79
decisionmaking, what is important is that they frequently say that
they do and that the Court often premises the need for standing
doctrine on this belief. By regularly invoking adversity as
fundamental to the standing inquiry, the Court achieves two related—
and problematic—ends. First, it reinforces the adversarial ideal and,
by associating standing doctrine with that ideal, both confers on
standing a legitimacy that it has not earned and suggests a need for it
that may not exist. Second, by promoting the notion that the
adversarial ideal is realized, the Court obscures the important
respects in which that adversarial commitment is more myth than
reality.
C. The Adversarial Myth in Practice
The adversarial ideal manifests itself in numerous practices and
procedures that define the U.S. legal system. For example, adverse
parties bear responsibility for providing factual evidence to trial
courts, which then assess and weigh the conflicting evidence. Unlike
in other court systems, judges in the adversarial system do not
actively seek out the relevant facts, but instead rely on the parties

change.”); see also Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 221 & n.10 (contrasting the ability of Congress to
initiate “inquiry and action, define issues and objectives, and exercise virtually unlimited power
by way of hearings and reports” to make a record with the reliance of the courts on “the parties’
treatment of the facts and claims before it to develop its rules of law”); cf. Neal Devins,
Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review: A Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUKE
L.J. 1169, 1178–82 (2001) (discussing the argument that Congress is better at factfinding than
courts); Kate T. Spelman, Revising Judicial Review of Legislative Findings of Scientific and
Medical “Fact”: A Modified Due Process Approach, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 837, 859–60
(2009) (same).
79. There is, of course, significant literature that questions whether standing doctrine is
merely an artifice for keeping certain cases out of court. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is
Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1742–43 (1999) (arguing that “[t]he doctrinal
elements of standing are nearly worthless” and that “judges provide access to the courts to
individuals who seek to further the political and ideological agendas of judges”). See generally
Daniel E. Ho & Erica L. Ross, Did Liberal Justices Invent the Standing Doctrine? An Empirical
Study of the Evolution of Standing, 1921–2006, 62 STAN. L. REV. 591 (2010) (discussing the
thesis that progressive Justices invented standing during the New Deal to “insulate”
administrative agencies from judicial review).
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80

before the court to provide them. Although there are mechanisms
81
by which nonparties can intervene in litigation, and by which trial
82
courts can solicit facts from nonparties, the use of such tools is the
83
exception, not the norm. Indeed, unlike at the appellate level, the
rules of procedure for district courts do not expressly provide for
84
amicus participation. And although district courts enjoy wide
discretion to invite such participation, it remains rare for them to do
85
so. Some courts have suggested that district courts should hesitate to
86
accept amicus briefs, particularly briefs that present facts not offered

80. See, e.g., Frost, supra note 1, at 449 (“[P]arty presentation is cited as the major
distinction between the adversarial system in the United States and the inquisitorial systems of
continental Europe, where judges take the lead in the investigation and presentation of the
case.”); Douglas H. Ginsburg, Appellate Courts and Independent Experts, 60 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 303, 314 (2010) (“Unlike a judge in the inquisitorial system of the civil law used
throughout Europe, a common law judge does not conduct his own investigation.” (footnote
omitted)).
81. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24 (providing rules for intervention of right and permissive
intervention).
82. See FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a)(1)(B) (providing for the appointment of a master under
specified circumstances to “hold trial proceedings and make or recommend findings of fact on
issues to be decided without a jury”).
83. Cf. Cindy Vreeland, Comment, Public Interest Groups, Public Law Litigation, and
Federal Rule 24(a), 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 279, 307 (1990) (“Several courts have relied on [a]
comment [to the 1966 amendments to Rule 24(a)] to limit their grants of intervention.”).
84. See, e.g., Michele Estrin Gilman, Litigating Presidential Signing Statements, 16 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 131, 152 n.169 (2007) (“There is no specific rule allowing for amicus
participation at the district court level, but it is widely recognized that district courts have broad
discretion to appoint amicus.”); see also Peter A. Appel, Intervention in Public Law Litigation:
The Environmental Paradigm, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 215, 309 (2000) (“The Advisory Committee
could encourage amicus participation in the district court by amending the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure to provide expressly for amicus participation.”).
85. See Linda Sandstrom Simard, An Empirical Study of Amici Curiae in Federal Court: A
Fine Balance of Access, Efficiency, and Adversarialism, 27 REV. LITIG. 669, 687 (2008) (“At the
district court level, amicus activity is even less significant, with the vast majority of District
Court Judges (79.2%) responding that amicus activity is nominal or zero, and 19.9% indicating
that approximately 5% of their docket involves amici curiae.”). There are, of course, exceptions
to this general rule. See, e.g., Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1084 n.8 (D. Or. 2002)
(“Amici curiae briefs have been filed on behalf of the following: New York Physicians, ACLU
Foundation of Oregon, Inc., Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Surviving Family
Members, Autonomy, Inc., et al, American Academy of Pain Management, et al, Coalition of
Mental Health Professionals, Not Dead Yet, et al, National Right to Life Committee and
Oregon Right to Life, and the Family Research Council.”), aff’d, 368 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2004),
aff’d sub nom. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
86. See, e.g., Strasser v. Doorley, 432 F.2d 567, 569 (1st Cir. 1970) (“[A] district court
lacking joint consent of the parties should go slow in accepting, and even slower in inviting, an
amicus brief unless, as a party, although short of a right to intervene, the amicus has a special
interest that justifies his having a say, or unless the court feels that existing counsel may need
supplementing assistance.”); News & Sun-Sentinel Co. v. Cox, 700 F. Supp. 30, 32 (S.D. Fla.
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87

by the parties. As one district court has noted, the growing trend
toward accepting amicus briefs may be “useful in a reviewing court
where, usually, only issues of law are resolved; it is not proper in a
88
trial court.”
Once the parties present the relevant facts and law, the trial
court is responsible for resolving these disputes in the first instance
and for establishing the factual record on which the case will be
89
decided. Indeed, whereas trial courts’ legal findings will be reviewed
90
anew by appellate courts, their factual findings will be reviewed only
91
92
for clear error, a meaningfully more difficult standard to meet.
1988) (“[A]cceptance of an . . . amicus curiae should be allowed only sparingly, unless the
amicus has a special interest, or unless the Court feels that existing counsel need assistance.”
(omission in original) (quoting Donovan v. Gillmor, 535 F. Supp. 154, 159 (N.D. Ohio 1982))
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Yip v. Pagano, 606 F. Supp. 1566, 1568 (D.N.J.
1985) (“At the trial level, where issues of fact as well as law predominate, the aid of amicus
curiae may be less appropriate than at the appellate level where such participation has become
standard procedure.”), aff’d, 782 F.2d 1033 (3d Cir. 1986).
87. See Strasser, 432 F.2d at 569 (“[A]n amicus who argues facts should rarely be
welcomed.”).
88. Leigh v. Engle, 535 F. Supp. 418, 422 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
89. K.K. DuVivier, Are Some Words Better Left Unpublished?: Precedent and the Role of
Unpublished Decisions, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 397, 400 (2001); see also Evan H. Caminker,
Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73
TEX. L. REV. 1, 41 (1994) (“Congress has vested trial courts with primary responsibility for
different functions than it has given appellate courts. The structure of and tasks assigned to trial
courts encourage their relative proficiency at factfinding, and appellate courts are designed and
situated to encourage a relative proficiency at legal reasoning.”); Miller & Barron, supra note
41, at 1187 (“The traditional or ‘Blackstonian’ conception of the judicial process clearly defines
the formal system of information flow to the court. Under this conception, an appellate
judge . . . accept[s] the facts as found by the trial court.”); cf. Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional
Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 234 (1985) (“[T]he categories of law and fact have
traditionally served an important regulatory function in distributing authority among various
decisionmakers in the legal system.”).
90. See, e.g., McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 867 (2005) (“This case comes
to us on appeal from a preliminary injunction. We accordingly review the District Court’s legal
rulings de novo, and its ultimate conclusion for abuse of discretion.”).
91. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 917 (1995) (“In our view, the District Court
applied the correct analysis, and its finding that race was the predominant factor motivating the
drawing of the Eleventh District was not clearly erroneous.”).
92. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (“This standard plainly
does not entitle a reviewing court to reverse the finding of the trier of fact simply because it is
convinced that it would have decided the case differently.”). Appellate courts do not always give
exactly the same deference to factual findings in all circumstances. For example, the Court has
recognized that even though “[t]he same ‘clearly erroneous’ standard applies to findings based
on documentary evidence as to those based entirely on oral testimony, . . . the presumption has
lesser force in the former situation than in the latter.” Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S.,
Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 500 (1984). The Court has also noted that “the standard [of review] does not
change as the trial becomes longer and more complex, but the likelihood that the appellate
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Multiple rationales have been offered for this deference to district
courts’ factual findings. District court judges actually see witnesses
93
and hear live testimony, and they thus develop experience in making
94
determinations of fact. Such deference also serves “the public
interest in the stability and judicial economy” that comes from
“recognizing . . . the trial court, not the appellate tribunal, [as] the
95
finder of the facts.” Deference is also accorded to trial court factual
findings because they sometimes reflect the findings of jurors drawn
96
from the community. And surely an important factor also is the trial
court’s closer interaction with the actual parties to the case. Although
not always true, the parties generally appear and often testify before
the trial court judge. By contrast, at the appellate court, where
questions of law predominate, the actual parties will much more
97
rarely appear or be noticed by members of the bench. There are thus
practical and dignitary values in deferring to the decisionmaker who
has most closely interacted with the parties who have knowledge of—
and responsibility for presenting—the relevant facts.
court will rely on the presumption tends to increase when trial judges have lived with the
controversy for weeks or months instead of just a few hours.” Id.
93. See, e.g., Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 438 (2007)
(“[D]eferential standards of review grant lower court judges discretion . . . because they are
better situated to make certain types of decisions, even though such deference may entail a loss
of uniformity in outcome.”); see also Boyd v. Boyd, 169 N.E. 632, 634 (N.Y. 1930) (“Face to face
with living witnesses, the original trier of the facts holds a position of advantage from which
appellate judges are excluded.”).
94. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574 (“The trial judge’s major role is the determination of fact,
and with experience in fulfilling that role comes expertise.”); see also Paul E. McGreal,
Ambition’s Playground, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1107, 1125–26 (2000) (noting that “the trial court
is believed to be in a better position than the appellate court to weigh evidence and find facts”
due to the expertise that comes with experience).
95. FED. R. CIV. P. 52 advisory committee’s note to 1985 amend. (“To permit courts of
appeals to share more actively in the fact-finding function would tend to undermine the
legitimacy of the district courts in the eyes of litigants, multiply appeals by encouraging
appellate retrial of some factual issues, and needlessly reallocate judicial authority.”); see also,
e.g., Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574–75 (“Duplication of the trial judge’s efforts in the court of
appeals would very likely contribute only negligibly to the accuracy of fact determination at a
huge cost in diversion of judicial resources.”); Amy J. Wildermuth & Lincoln L. Davies,
Standing, on Appeal, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 957, 978–79 (discussing the various reasons why
appellate courts defer to the factual findings of trial courts).
96. See, e.g., Fredric I. Lederer, The Effect of Courtroom Technologies on and in Appellate
Proceedings and Courtrooms, 2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 251, 259–60 (2000) (“In the case of
jury trials, appellate deference is further justified by the special role of the jury as the
community’s fact-finding representative.”).
97. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Natural Justice, 51 AM. J. JURIS. 65, 80 (2006) (“The
parties to an appellate proceeding frequently do not appear, and if they do, they sit in the
audience without any formal participation in the appellate process itself.”).
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Thus, the U.S. legal system’s adversarial commitment manifests
itself in the very structure of the court system—both in how the facts
are presented and in which court is responsible for finding them. The
existence of this commitment is important because it fosters
complacency, suggesting that parties can be relied upon to present
courts with all of the information that they need and that the factual
findings on which cases will ultimately be decided will be those found
by the trial court based on the presentations of adverse parties. It
suggests that there is no reason to worry about the quality of the
factual findings that underlie the decisions the U.S. judicial system
reaches, at least insofar as the adversarial system can be relied upon
as a rigorous means of testing factual claims. But, as I discuss in the
next Part, an examination of appellate factfinding reveals that, in this
important context, the United States’ commitment to an adversarial
system of justice is often more myth than reality.
II. UNDERMINING THE MYTH
As much as courts may tout the importance of adversarialism
and maintain that they rely on proper parties to develop the factual
record, courts often fail to practice what they preach. Appellate
courts, particularly the Supreme Court, routinely consider facts that
98
were not made part of the record below. I begin this Part with a few
examples of appellate court reliance on facts not provided by the
99
parties to the litigation. But evidence that appellate courts consider

98. See Michael Abramowicz & Thomas B. Colby, Notice-and-Comment Judicial
Decisionmaking, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 965, 971–72 (2009) (“Sometimes the court will decide the
case on the basis of ‘facts’ in the record not addressed by the parties—which means that the
court’s decision is driven by evidence that the parties never explained and the meaning or
importance of which they never contested.” (footnote omitted)); infra Part II.A.
99. Two methodological points are in order. First, I look at appellate court opinions
because they provide the clearest evidence of appellate court reliance on extra-record facts.
That said, there may often be facts that influence—consciously or otherwise—judges’ decisions,
even though they do not make it into the official explanation of the judges’ reasoning that
appears in a published opinion. A more thorough examination of oral argument transcripts and
briefs might provide some sense of the extent to which this occurs, cf. Transcript of Oral
Argument at 18–19, Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003) (No. 01-1559) (providing the
Court with “essentially anecdotal reports” in response to a query for factual information that
was not part of the record below), but of course even those sources cannot reveal the extent to
which judges engage in independent research. Second, I assume that the facts in appellate court
opinions do, in fact, influence the judges’ decisions. Admittedly, there is a strong strain of
academic thought that suggests that judges’ decisions are shaped more by ideology than by the
law, see generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993), and that they simply select the facts that support the result they
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extra-record facts is not merely anecdotal. Indeed, there is at least
one well-established and formalized method—which I consider later
in this Part—by which they actually encourage nonparties to provide
information different than that provided by the parties: the amicus
brief.
A. Appellate Courts and Extra-Record Factfinding
As I discussed in Part I, the Supreme Court is a frequent
champion of the adversarial ideal, regularly invoking the idea that
courts can rely on adverse parties to adequately develop the records
needed to decide cases. Among all of the courts in the federal system,
the Supreme Court is in some sense the Court best suited for realizing
this ideal. Although the Supreme Court generally hears the most
100
significant cases in the nation’s court system —cases in which one
would want the underlying factual record to be as complete as
possible—the Supreme Court also, alone among the federal courts,
101
has a virtually discretionary docket.
This discretionary docket enables the Court to select those cases
102
that are particularly well suited for its review. One might think,
want, see Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings,
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1419 (1995) (“The philosophy of legal realists was that judges reasoned
backward from result to rationale, selecting rules and facts to fit into a preordained pattern.”). It
may also be the case that judges are genuinely unaware of all of the factors that are motivating
their decisions. See, e.g., David L. Faigman, Nilanjana Dasgupta & Cecilia L. Ridgeway, A
Matter of Fit: The Law of Discrimination and the Science of Implicit Bias, 59 HASTINGS L.J.
1389, 1404 (2008) (“One of the most important discoveries in empirical social psychology in the
twentieth century is that people’s perceptions and behavior are often shaped by factors that lie
outside their awareness and cannot be fully understood by intuitive methods such as selfreflection.”). But even if that is true in some cases, there are many others in which judges’
understandings of the relevant facts do inform their decisionmaking. See id. at 1419 (noting the
constraints on judges that prevent them from simply reasoning backward from result to
rationale). And even if judges sometimes use facts as rhetorical tools, see id. (noting that “[t]he
way [judges] present the facts” can be a form of rhetoric), the fact that they often use extrarecord facts as those rhetorical tools suggests that those facts are also influencing their decisions.
100. See, e.g., Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of Judicial Review Revisited, or How the
Marshall Court Made More Out of Less, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 787, 787 (1999) (“Certainly
the federal judges, and especially the Justices of the Supreme Court, . . . exercise an
extraordinary degree of authority over our society and culture.”).
101. See, e.g., Brent E. Newton, Applications for Certificates of Appealability and the
Supreme Court’s “Obligatory” Jurisdiction, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 177, 177 (2003) (“Since
1925, with the passage of the Judges’ Bill, Congress increasingly has afforded the Supreme
Court unfettered discretion to decide whichever cases it chooses.” (footnote omitted)).
102. While the Supreme Court’s selection process is guided by substantive considerations,
such as whether there is a division of views among the lower courts and whether the case
presents an issue of national importance, SUP. CT. R. 10; see also Kevin H. Smith, Certiorari and
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therefore, that it would select only those cases in which the record
contains all of the information the Court will need to resolve the case,
and would avoid those in which it would be forced to look outside the
103
record for facts the parties failed to adequately present. Yet the
Court regularly grants certiorari in cases that require it to ultimately
look outside the record for relevant factual assertions, and it often
104
makes factual assertions without any citation at all. A couple of
cases prove the point.

the Supreme Court Agenda: An Empirical Analysis, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 727, 734–38 (2001)
(discussing factors that affect the Supreme Court’s decision to grant certiorari), the Court also
considers other factors related not to the substantive legal question at issue but instead to how
well that question has been presented. For example, the Court considers whether the record was
adequately developed below and whether there will be quality lawyering. See Abramowicz &
Colby, supra note 98, at 1001 n.188 (observing that “one of the factors that has influenced the
Court’s decisions to deny certiorari is the presence of ‘poor lawyering’” (quoting Stephen M.
Shapiro, Certiorari Practice: The Supreme Court’s Shrinking Docket, LITIGATION, Spring 1998,
at 25, 30)).
103. To be sure, there might sometimes be cases where there are strong reasons for the
Court to grant certiorari, notwithstanding the fact that the case is not otherwise well presented
for review. Moreover, the Court’s ability to assess the adequacy of the record based on the
materials that are submitted at the certiorari stage is not perfect. But even if there are some
cases that fall into each of these categories, one would still think that cases in which the Court
looks outside the record developed below would be the exception, not the rule. As I will discuss,
however, the Court’s reliance on extra-record factual development has become an accepted part
of its practice.
104. Although the Court surely sometimes regrets its decision to grant certiorari in a
particular case, see, e.g., Richard L. Revesz & Pamela S. Karlan, Nonmajority Rules and the
Supreme Court, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1082–95 (1988) (discussing “DIGs”—cases the Court
decides to dismiss after having granted certiorari), the Court has ample opportunity prior to
granting certiorari to determine whether there is an adequate factual record, see, e.g., Margaret
Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari: Jurisprudential
Considerations in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 389, 390 (2004) (“[T]he
Justices typically make decisions about whether to grant certiorari according to vague guidelines
that afford them maximum discretion . . . .”); Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard
Cordray, The Supreme Court’s Plenary Docket, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 737, 791 (2001)
(noting the existence of the “cert pool” in addition to “individualized screening mechanisms”);
cf. David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Gatekeepers: The Role of Law Clerks in the Certiorari
Process, 85 TEX. L. REV. 947, 974–76 (2007) (book review) (arguing that the process for
reviewing certiorari petitions tends to encourage the denial of petitions, not the granting of
them).
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In Citizens United v. FEC, a significant corporate speech case,
the Supreme Court overruled long-standing precedent and held
unconstitutional a federal law that prohibited “corporations and
unions from using their general treasury funds” to engage in political
107
speech. In reaching this result, the Court repeatedly relied on facts
108
that were not part of the record created by the parties below.
Throughout the Court’s analysis, it made factual assertions with
citation only to an amicus brief or, even more disturbingly, without
citation at all. Indeed, there was little evidence in the Court’s opinion
of any record developed by the adversaries who had litigated the case
109
below.

105. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
106. See, e.g., id. at 933 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The Court
operates with a sledge hammer rather than a scalpel when it strikes down one of Congress’ most
significant efforts to regulate the role that corporations and unions play in electoral politics. It
compounds the offense by implicitly striking down a great many state laws as well.”); see also
Michael Waldman, Preface to MONEY, POLITICS, AND THE CONSTITUTION: BEYOND CITIZENS
UNITED, at xi, xi (Monica Youn ed., 2011) (noting that Citizens United “ranks among the
Court’s most controversial and consequential” decisions because, in part, “[i]n the 2010 election,
independent spending spiked, much of it secret, with more to come”); Emma Dumain,
Democrats Raising Money They Oppose, ROLL CALL (May 10, 2011, 12:00 AM),
http://www.rollcall.com/issues/56_120/Democrats-Raising-Money-They-Oppose-205488-1.html
(“Democratic operatives are racing to organize new groups to solicit and spend millions of
dollars that the [Citizens United] ruling allowed, gearing up to play by the same rules as
Republicans regardless of whether they like those rules. They all insist that they don’t. But after
watching Republicans take advantage of the new rules to spend unprecedented volumes of cash
and win House and Senate seats across the map in the 2010 midterm elections, they say they can
no longer stand back on moral grounds.”); Lisa Rosenberg, Happy Anniversary Citizens United,
SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Jan. 19, 2011, 11:42 AM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2011/01/19/
happy-anniversary-citizens-united (“As a result of [Citizens United], dark money spending to
elect or defeat candidates in the 2010 midterms topped $450 million dollars, or about 15 percent
of total spending on elections.”).
107. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886 (considering the constitutionality of 2 U.S.C. § 441b
(2006) and overruling Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990)).
More precisely, the provision at issue prohibits the use of general treasury funds “to make
independent expenditures for speech defined as an ‘electioneering communication’ or for
speech expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate.” Id. (quoting 2 U.S.C.
§ 441b).
108. See infra notes 110–120 and accompanying text.
109. To be sure, one could argue that the Citizens United Court needed to rely on extrarecord facts: a record for the facial challenge was not made below because the parties had only
pursued an as-applied challenge before the trial court, and the Supreme Court converted it to a
facial challenge on appeal. See infra notes 123–125 and accompanying text. But this situation
was one of the Court’s own making. It did not need to decide the facial issue to intimate what its
views on any facial challenge would be, cf. Neal Kumar Katyal, Judges as Advicegivers, 50 STAN.
L. REV. 1709, 1711 (1998) (“The combination of ‘narrow holding + advicegiving dicta’ enjoys a
natural advantage over a broad holding in terms of democratic self-rule, flexibility, popular

GOROD IN PRINTER PROOF

2011]

10/6/2011 6:57:08 PM

THE ADVERSARIAL MYTH

29

For example, in concluding that the provision at issue violated
the First Amendment, the Court first determined that it operated as
110
an actual ban—as opposed to just a limitation—on political speech.
In doing so, the Court’s majority had to explain why it was not
sufficient that corporations and unions could establish political action
committees (PACs) that could engage in speech. To the Court, the
first and most simple answer was that “[a] PAC is a separate
association from the corporation. So the PAC exemption from
111
§ 441b’s expenditure ban does not allow corporations to speak.” But
the Court also explained that “[e]ven if a PAC could somehow allow
a corporation to speak—and it does not—the option to form PACs
does not alleviate the First Amendment problems with § 441b. PACs
are burdensome alternatives; they are expensive to administer and
112
subject to extensive regulations.” The Court went on to detail the
regulations to which PACs are subject, but it did not offer any
additional support for the separate observations that they are
expensive and burdensome, other than to note that fewer than 2,000
of the millions of corporations in this country have PACs. And to
support that fact, the Court cited not the record below, but an amicus
113
brief and an IRS bulletin.
Even more critically, the Court relied on extra-record facts in
determining whether there was any compelling interest sufficient to
114
justify the federal restriction on corporate speech. In rejecting an
115
anticorruption rationale, the Court concluded that “independent
accountability, and adaptability.”), or, alternatively, it could have remanded the case to the trial
court to decide the facial issue in the first instance.
110. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 897 (“Section 441b is a ban on corporate speech
notwithstanding the fact that a [political action committee] created by a corporation can still
speak.”).
111. Id. (citation omitted).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 897–98 (citing Brief Amici Curiae of Seven Former Chairmen and One Former
Commissioner of the Federal Election Commission Supporting Appellant on Supplemental
Question at 11, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08-205); and IRS, 2006 STATISTICS OF
INCOME: CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETURNS 2 (2009)).
114. The Court first held that corporations enjoy First Amendment rights. Citizens United,
130 S. Ct. at 899.
115. The Court considered three possible rationales: anti-corruption, see Supplemental Brief
for the Appellee at 8, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08-205) (“Corporate participation in
candidate elections creates a substantial risk of corruption or the appearance thereof.”); antidistortion, see Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 903 (describing the possible rationale as an “interest
in preventing ‘the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are
accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the
public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas’” (quoting Austin v. Mich. State Chamber
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expenditures, including those made by corporations, do not give rise
116
to corruption or the appearance of corruption.” In reaching that
conclusion, the Court did not cite the record below. Instead, it noted
that in a case decided more than thirty years earlier, the Court had
recognized that there was less risk of corruption in the context of
independent expenditures than in the context of direct
117
contributions. It further observed that “[t]he fact that speakers may
have influence over or access to elected officials does not mean that
these officials are corrupt,” citing a statement from an earlier separate
118
opinion authored by Justice Kennedy. The Court ultimately did cite
119
a court record —but a record from a campaign finance case decided
nearly a decade before, in which the court was not even considering
the same issue and in which the present parties obviously had had no
120
opportunity to develop facts.
My purpose here is not to address the validity of the Court’s
121
conclusions, but simply to point out the extent to which the Court
of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990))); and shareholder protection, see Supplemental Brief
for the Appellee, supra, at 13 (“Congress and state governments may appropriately act to
protect shareholders’ interests in avoiding unwanted subsidization of electioneering.”). The
Court rejected each of these rationales. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 90411.
116. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909.
117. Id. at 90809 (discussing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976)).
118. Id. at 910 (citing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part)).
119. Id. at 91011 (“The [record in McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D.D.C.) (per
curiam), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United, 130
S. Ct. 876,] was ‘over 100,000 pages’ long, yet it ‘does not have any direct examples of votes
being exchanged for . . . expenditures.’” (omission in original) (citations omitted) (quoting
McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 209; and id. at 560 (Kollar-Kotelly, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part))).
120. See id. at 933 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the
McConnell “record [was] not before [the Court] in [Citizens United]” and that, in any event, it
did not provide a basis for assessing the specific arguments on which the majority based its
decision to strike down the statute). To be sure, reliance on a prior court record may in some
cases be preferable to reliance on no record at all, but rarely will an appellate judge be limited
to just those two options. Moreover, when he is, there are steps he should take to ensure that
reliance on the prior record is appropriate. See infra Part V.B.
121. A rich literature on the Court’s decision in Citizens United is quickly developing. See,
e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581,
605–10 (2011) (examining the role foreign spending may have played in the Court’s decision);
Alexander Polikoff, So How Did We Get into This Mess? Observations on the Legitimacy of
Citizens United, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 203, 219–21 (2010), http://
www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2011/4/LRColl2010n4Polikoff.pdf (arguing that
“[e]vidence that corporate independent expenditures give rise to an appearance of corruption is
extensive” and that “[t]here is no—literally no—factual support for Justice Kennedy’s” legal
conclusions).
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relied on extra-record facts in reaching them. As the dissent pointed
out, the majority rested its holding—a facial invalidation of the
campaign finance provision—on “pure speculation” about the larger
consequences of the provision and its effect on parties other than
Citizens United:
In this case, the record is not simply incomplete or unsatisfactory; it
is nonexistent. Congress crafted [the federal law at issue] in response
to a virtual mountain of research on the corruption that previous
legislation had failed to avert. The Court now negates Congress’
efforts without a shred of evidence on how § 203 or its state-law
counterparts have been affecting any entity other than Citizens
122
United.

That there was no record was hardly surprising: although
Citizens United initially brought a facial challenge, it abandoned that
challenge in favor of a more narrow, as-applied challenge early in the
123
trial court litigation, before any factual record was developed.
Indeed, “[s]hortly before Citizens United . . . abandon[ed] its facial
challenge, the Government advised the District Court that it
‘require[d] time to develop a factual record regarding [the] facial
124
challenge.’” Thus, as the dissent explained, “By reinstating a claim
that Citizens United [had] abandoned, the Court [gave] it a perverse
litigating advantage over its adversary, which was deprived of the
opportunity to gather and present information necessary to its
125
rebuttal.”
Indeed, by setting the case for reargument rather than
126
remanding to the district court for further factfinding, the Court

122. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 933 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The dissent notes:
[W]e do not even have a good evidentiary record of how § 203 has been affecting
Citizens United, which never submitted to the District Court the details of Hillary’s
funding or its own finances. We likewise have no evidence of how § 203 and
comparable state laws were expected to affect corporations and unions in the future.
Id. at 933 n.5.
123. Id. at 933.
124. Id. at 933 n.4 (third and fourth alterations in original).
125. Id.; see also id. at 933 (“Had Citizens United maintained a facial challenge, and thus
argued that there are virtually no circumstances in which [the law at issue] can be applied
constitutionally, the parties could have developed, through the normal process of litigation, a
record about the actual effects of § 203, its actual burdens and its actual benefits, on all manner
of corporations and unions.”).
126. See Citizens United v. FEC, 129 S. Ct. 2893 (2009) (mem.) (requesting reargument on
whether “the Court [should] overrule either or both” Austin and part of McConnell v. FEC, 540
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ensured that factual development would occur largely by amicus brief
and other extra-record sources, rather than by the parties before the
district court. To be sure, although it might theoretically have been
possible for the parties to present the Court with some factual
information in their briefs, it would have been impossible for the
parties in Citizens United to present the Court with all of the relevant
information in their briefs, given the strict page limitations on
127
Supreme Court briefs and the impossibility of predicting what facts
the Court would draw from outside the briefs and lower court record.
If the Court’s reliance on extra-record facts was particularly
striking in Citizens United, it is hardly anomalous. In Gonzales v.
128
Carhart, the Court considered a federal statute concerned not with
campaign finance restrictions, but with restrictions on the availability
129
of certain abortion procedures, and this time, the Court upheld the
130
statute. Relying on its own factual findings, the Court concluded
that legitimate governmental objectives supported the enactment of
131
the statute. Most significantly, even though it recognized that there
was “no reliable data to measure the phenomenon,” the Court
deemed it “unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret
their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained”
132
and noted that “[s]evere depression and loss of esteem can follow.”
For this proposition, the Court cited the amicus brief of Sandra Cano,
133
the former “Mary Doe” of Doe v. Bolton, and “180 women injured
134
by abortion.” The Court, of course, did not actually have the
opportunity to hear these women testify, nor was there adequate
U.S. 93 (2003)). Indeed, the Supreme Court does sometimes remand to the lower court when it
believes more factual development of the record is necessary. See infra note 313.
127. SUP. CT. R. 33.2(b).
128. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
129. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006).
130. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 133.
131. Id. at 158.
132. Id. at 159.
133. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). Doe was the companion case to Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973). Cano was in some respects an odd choice to testify to the adverse consequences
of having an abortion because she now explains that she “never wanted an abortion in Doe v.
Bolton and fraud was perpetrated on the Court.” Brief of Sandra Cano, the Former “Mary
Doe” of Doe v. Bolton, and 180 Women Injured by Abortion as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 1, Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (No. 05-380); see also id. app. at 3 (“I was a trusting person
and did not read the papers placed in front of me by my lawyer. I truly thought Margie Pitts
Hames was having me sign divorce papers. I did not even suspect that the papers related to
abortion . . . .”).
134. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159 (citing Brief of Sandra Cano, supra note 133, at 22–24).
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opportunity for the other side to give the Court a sense of how
representative the women who had signed that amicus brief were.
And, again, when the Court alluded to an actual court record, it was
135
not the record in the case before it.
Indeed, even when the Court does rely heavily on the record
developed by the district court, it often does not limit itself to that
136
record. In an earlier abortion case, Stenberg v. Carhart, the Court
considered the constitutionality of a Nebraska statute banning so137
In setting out the Court’s
called partial-birth abortion.
understanding of the factual lay of the land—information about
abortions generally and about the procedure at issue specifically—the
138
Court repeatedly looked to the “materials presented at trial,” but in
doing so, it considered “[t]he evidence before the trial court, as
139
supported or supplemented in the literature.” As a court of appeals
subsequently noted:
[T]he Court supplemented the district court record with information
from a significant array of medical sources. Extra-record sources
considered by the Court included medical textbooks and journals
relating to abortion, obstetrics, and gynecology; the factual records
developed in prior “partial birth abortion” cases; and amicus briefs
(with citations to medical authority) submitted on behalf of medical
140
organizations.

135. Id. (“Any number of patients facing imminent surgical procedures would prefer not to
hear all details, lest the usual anxiety preceding invasive medical procedures become the more
intense. This is likely the case with the abortion procedures here in issue.” (citing Nat’l
Abortion Fed’n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated sub nom. Nat’l
Abortion Fed’n v. Gonzales, 224 Fed. App’x 88, 88 (2d Cir. 2007))). Most of the plaintiffs’
experts cited in this district court opinion acknowledged that they did not describe the abortion
procedure in detail to their patients. Nat’l Abortion Fed’n, 333 F. Supp. 2d at 466 n.22.
136. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
137. Id. at 929–30.
138. Id. at 929.
139. Id. at 923 (emphasis added).
140. Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Hicks, 409 F.3d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 2005), vacated sub
nom. Herring v. Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women, 550 U.S. 901 (2007). These abortion cases
followed in the path established by the original abortion case—Roe v. Wade. In that case, Justice
Blackmun did extensive independent research that ultimately found its way into the Court’s
opinion. See Joseph F. Kobylka, Tales from the Blackmun Papers: A Fuller Appreciation of
Harry Blackmun’s Judicial Legacy, 70 MO. L. REV. 1075, 108788 (2005) (“The summer months
saw the Justices scatter. Justice Blackmun repaired to the library at the Mayo Clinic to research
the medical history of abortion and tasked one of his clerks to write this research into the Roe
and Doe opinions.”).
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The Court’s decision in Stenberg may be intuitively less troubling
than the decisions in Carhart and Citizens United because the Court
relied heavily on the district court record and because its statements
of extra-record facts seem well sourced. Nonetheless, the fact that it
would look to extra-record facts even when the parties and trial court
had developed a substantial factual record highlights the
pervasiveness of the Court’s recourse to extra-record facts. Moreover,
this sampling of cases suggests how varied the quality of factfinding
can be when an appellate court engages in that task with little or no
assistance from the parties and the trial court.
I have focused here on the Supreme Court because that is where
recourse to extra-record factfinding is most pervasive—and most
pernicious—but this reliance on extra-record facts also occurs in the
141
courts of appeals. Although it may occur less commonly in the
142
courts of appeals, that makes the practice no less troubling. After
all, even if this recourse to extra-record facts happened only at the
Supreme Court or only rarely, it would still be troubling, given that it
happens in ways that are significant to the outcome of some of the
143
most consequential cases the nation’s courts decide. But these
cases—and the ones I discuss later in this Article—are but a few

141. See, e.g., Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 379–405 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citing
numerous law review articles that provide information relevant to the original meaning of the
Second Amendment), aff’d sub nom. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008);
United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229, 1238 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing a “recent edition of a
national magazine” to show the importance the public attached to the availability of single-sex
education), rev’d, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). For a discussion of how appellate courts have used
statistical studies when addressing abortion restrictions, see infra Part III.B.
142. I plan to take up in a different work a more systematic examination of the use of extrarecord facts at different levels of the federal court system. If appellate courts do in fact rely on
extra-record sources less frequently than the Supreme Court, that difference surely reflects in
part the different nature of the cases that appellate courts hear. In other words, because the U.S.
legal system includes one appeal as of right, Harlon Leigh Dalton, Taking the Right To Appeal
(More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE L.J. 62, 62 (1985), the courts of appeals hear many more
cases than the Supreme Court, and many of those cases will require only straightforward
application of an established legal rule. In those cases, there will generally be no need to resort
to extra-record facts. Moreover, as I discuss in the next Section, amicus briefs play a significant
role in helping appellate courts find legislative facts, and cases in the courts of appeals may
attract less significant amicus attention than do Supreme Court cases, in part because of the
nature of the cases and in part because amicus organizations sometimes have incentives to wait
until the issue is before the Supreme Court. All that said, it may also be that appellate judges
tend to view their role differently than do Supreme Court Justices. By comparing the use of
extra-record facts in the same cases at both the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court, I hope
to elucidate the answers to these questions.
143. For a discussion of the problematic consequences of extra-record appellate court
factfinding, see infra Part IV.
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examples of the recurring phenomenon by which appellate courts,
particularly the Supreme Court, look outside the record to make
factual findings. Indeed, one need not rely on anecdotal evidence to
appreciate the regularity with which appellate courts rely on extrarecord facts because there is one significant respect in which appellate
courts invite nonparties to provide them with extra-record facts: the
rules providing for amicus briefs.
B. Amicus Practice
144

The amicus curiae—or “friend of the Court” —brief is a vehicle
by which individuals or organizations that would not otherwise have
standing to participate in a case can present their own arguments and
145
information to the court. Although amicus briefs are often filed in
146
the courts of appeals, they are most common in the Supreme Court,
147
where they are now filed in virtually every case. In significant cases,

144. See, e.g., 4 AM. JUR. 2D Amicus Curiae § 1 (2007) (“The literal meaning of the term
‘amicus curiae’ is a friend of the court.”).
145. See, e.g., Caldeira & Wright, supra note 27, at 782 n.1 (noting that “‘standing’ [has]
limits, so a brief amicus curiae can and does serve an important function” by serving “as a
vehicle for interests other than those of the parties”); see also id. at 783 (“The Supreme Court’s
continued willingness to receive this rising tide of briefs from not-so-disinterested third parties
is, in our view, tacit recognition that most matters before the justices have vast social, political,
and economic ramifications—far beyond the interest of the immediate parties.”). Of course,
amicus briefs are sometimes encouraged by the parties, see, e.g., McGuire, supra note 27, at 822
(“[T]o the extent that the goals of lawyers and organized groups intersect, their mutual interests
create incentives to build coalitions with one another.”); John Harrington, Note, Amici Curiae
in the Federal Courts of Appeals: How Friendly Are They?, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 667, 674
(2005) (“Amici are often not only interested third parties, but extensions of the parties
themselves. Parties often solicit amicus support as another weapon in the adversarial struggle.”);
see also Voices for Choices v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 339 F.3d 542, 544 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.,
opinion in chambers) (“[A]micus briefs, often solicited by parties, may be used to make an end
run around court-imposed limitations on the length of parties’ briefs.”), but how involved the
parties are in their content and arguments varies widely across cases.
146. See, e.g., Ruben J. Garcia, A Democratic Theory of Amicus Advocacy, 35 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 315, 322–24 (2008) (discussing federal circuit courts’ amicus filing rules); Harrington, supra
note 145, at 673–74 (discussing amicus practices in the courts of appeals).
147. Collins, supra note 27, at 807–08; see also id. at 810–11 (noting the increase in the
number of amicus briefs and cosigners since the 1960s); Haw, supra note 28, at 1251 (“[T]he
number of amicus briefs filed at the Supreme Court rose 800% between 1946 and 1995.”);
O’Connor & Epstein, supra note 27, at 315 (noting that “interest group amicus participation in
noncommercial cases before the Supreme Court was nearly nonexistent until World War II, that
it rose significantly after the war, and that it then accelerated very rapidly in the late 1960s and
1970s”).
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amicus briefs can number in the double digits. Although the
149
evidence is mixed, there is a general consensus in the literature that
150
amicus briefs often influence the Court’s decisionmaking.
The current Supreme Court rules do more than simply allow
amicus briefs; they expressly encourage nonparties to use them to
assist the Court in engaging in extra-record factfinding. The rules
provide that amicus briefs should not simply regurgitate arguments
and information provided by the parties: such briefs “burden[] the
151
Court, and [their] filing is not favored.” To the contrary, an amicus
brief that will be “of considerable help to the Court” is one that
“brings to the attention of the Court relevant matter not already
152
brought to its attention by the parties.” And the Supreme Court rules
place virtually no limit on who can file such a brief. Although an
amicus brief can be filed only if “accompanied by the written consent
153
of all parties, or if the Court grants leave to file,” “[t]he general
practice of the U.S. Supreme Court . . . is to allow essentially
154
unlimited amicus participation.”
148. Collins, supra note 27, at 812 (noting that in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,
492 U.S. 490 (1989), seventy-eight amicus briefs were filed, representing more than 400 different
organizations).
149. See, e.g., Caldeira & Wright, supra note 27, at 788 (“[S]ome circumstantial evidence
suggests that [amicus briefs] might very well be important.”); Collins, supra note 27, at 808 & n.1
(noting that past research suggests that amici can be influential but also acknowledging
dissensus on this point).
150. See, e.g., Spriggs & Wahlbeck, supra note 27, at 373 (“Much judicial research suggests
that the Court’s members find amicus briefs useful, borrowing from them when writing their
opinions.”). But see Caldeira & Wright, supra note 27, at 788 (suggesting that amici play a much
more significant role at the certiorari stage than at the merits stage).
151. SUP. CT. R. 37(1).
152. Id. (emphasis added). The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure also explicitly provide
for the filing of amicus briefs. FED. R. APP. P. 29.
153. SUP. CT. R. 37(2)(a).
154. Caldeira & Wright, supra note 27, at 784; see also Collins, supra note 27, at 809
(“Though Supreme Court Rule 37 contains explicit guidelines regarding amicus curiae
participation on the merits, in practice, the Court allows for essentially unlimited
participation.”). Amicus participation was not always as robust. The Court has at times been
less liberal in accepting briefs and has even encouraged the solicitor general to deny consent to
their filing. See Caldeira & Wright, supra note 27, at 785 (discussing Justice Frankfurter’s
“restrictive view” of amicus curiae briefs). In a memorandum to the other members of the
Court, Justice Frankfurter once subtly alluded to the tension caused by nonparties making
arguments different from those offered by the parties: “those responsible for arguing
cases . . . ought not to be embarrassed by amici briefs that may give a different shape or twist to
the argument . . . as the parties molded it.” Id. at 784 (omissions in original) (quoting Justice
Frankfurter) (internal quotation marks omitted). Justice Black responded by noting that
“[m]ost of the cases that come before the Court involve matters that affect far more people than
the immediate record parties.” Id. at 784–85 (quoting Justice Black) (internal quotation marks
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Although amicus briefs have been the focus of significant
155
scholarly attention, there has been no effort to square the Court’s
reliance on amicus briefs with its purported commitment to an
adversarial system of justice. Indeed, not even the Court itself has
attempted to explain why the practice is appropriate. To be sure,
sometimes a dissenting justice will chastise the majority for relying on
amicus briefs rather than the factual record developed below—in
156
FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee, for
example, a Justice criticized the majority for “not examin[ing] the
record or the findings of the District Court, but instead rel[ying]
wholly on the ‘observ[ations]’ of the ‘political scientists’ who happen
157
to have written an amicus brief in support of the petitioner” —but
people in glass houses do sometimes throw stones. Justices who
criticize the practice in one case often turn to amici to decide issues in
the next without themselves acknowledging, let alone explaining, the
158
tension between the Court’s practice and its mythology. It is that
tension—its cause and its consequences—that I consider in the
remainder of this Article.
III. A DIFFERENT KIND OF FACTS
This Article has focused thus far on what I have referred to as
the adversarial myth—the belief that appellate courts rely on the
parties to present relevant factual information, even as they regularly
resort to extra-record facts that have not been thoroughly tested in
the adversarial process. This myth, in turn, is based on yet another
myth—the notion that the role of the courts is simply to apply clear
159
legal rules to disputes between private parties. In cases where the

omitted). Justice Black thought that “the public interest and judicial administration would be
better served by relaxing rather than tightening the rule against amicus curiae briefs.” Id. at 785
(quoting Justice Black) (internal quotation marks omitted). And Justice Burton made a practice
of considering whether the parties could sufficiently present the cert-worthiness of their case
and whether the amici represented one of the party’s points of view in deciding whether to allow
an amicus brief to be filed. Id. at 785 n.4.
155. See supra notes 145–154 and accompanying text.
156. FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431 (2001).
157. Id. at 472 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (third alteration in original) (quoting id. at 449
(majority opinion)).
158. For example, the same Justice who criticized the use of amicus briefs in Colorado
Republican Federal Campaign Committee has also used them himself. See Parents Involved in
Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2776–77 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(relying on facts provided in the amicus briefs submitted in the case).
159. See supra note 41.
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court’s role is simply to apply clear legal rules, the standard
procedures make sense because the relevant facts are ones
particularly within the knowledge of those parties who will be most
160
affected if the factual presentation is incomplete.
But there are many cases that do not fit this model because the
relevant facts are not so limited and because the courts are not simply
applying settled law to disputed facts. Rather, in these cases, courts
are crafting legal rules and principles—based on general facts about
the state of the world—that will apply not only to the case at hand,
but to many other cases as well. Resolving these types of cases
requires consideration of a different kind of facts—facts about the
larger world that are not uniquely within the knowledge of the parties
161
to the litigation.
This distinction between adjudicative facts and legislative facts—
a distinction Professor Kenneth Culp Davis discusses in his 1942
article on “[p]roblems of [e]vidence in the [a]dministrative
162
[p]rocess” —can help explain the existence of the adversarial myth.
Because the adversarial system and its rules were designed for
adjudicative facts, courts tend to ignore the rules when they are
considering cases that turn instead on legislative facts. And because
courts have largely ignored this distinction between adjudicative and
163
legislative facts, they have failed to recognize both what they are
doing and the need for new rules specifically equipped to address
legislative facts.
I begin this Part by discussing the distinction between the two
types of facts. I then explore what can be learned from the limited
attention that this distinction has received in the case law. Finally, I

160. For a discussion of how the courts’ standard procedures rely on parties to provide the
courts with the relevant factual information, see supra Part I.B–C.
161. See infra notes 167–174 and accompanying text.
162. Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative
Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402–03 (1942) [hereinafter Davis, Problems of Evidence]; see
also Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 945, 952–59 (1955) [hereinafter
Davis, Judicial Notice]; infra Part III.C.
163. Davis, Judicial Notice, supra note 162, at 958 (“Only rarely have courts specifically
articulated the distinction between legislative and adjudicative facts for purposes of judicial or
official notice.”); Robert E. Keeton, Legislative Facts and Similar Things: Deciding Disputed
Premise Facts, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1, 14 (1988) (“[R]elatively little explicit discussion of this
distinction has appeared in judicial opinions.”); see also In re Asbestos Litig., 829 F.2d 1233,
1245 (3d Cir. 1987) (Becker, J., concurring) (“The subject of legislative fact-finding is rarely
discussed in the jurisprudence . . . .”).
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offer an explanation for why most courts have failed to meaningfully
acknowledge this important distinction.
A. Explaining Legislative Facts
In the vast majority of cases, courts apply settled principles of
164
law to disputed facts; the main work of the court is to resolve the
parties’ disputes about what happened to whom and when. How the
court resolves these disputes determines how the rule of law should
be applied, but will have no effect on the rule of law itself. These facts
that are related to the particular parties before the court—
165
adjudicative facts —are what courts and commentators most often
166
have in mind when they refer to the “facts of the case.”
But there is another kind of fact that is no less important—and,
in fact, is arguably more important—to the courts’ resolution of many
legal disputes. Unlike adjudicative facts, which deal with the
167
particular, legislative facts deal with the general,
providing
168
descriptive, and sometimes predictive, information about the larger
169
world. Not to be confused with facts found by a legislature, these
facts are called legislative facts because they are general and because
164. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 534 (1991).
165. David L. Faigman, “Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding”: Exploring the Empirical
Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 552 (1991); see also Dean
Alfange, Jr., The Relevance of Legislative Facts in Constitutional Law, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 637,
640 (1966) (“[A]djudicative facts . . . deal with particular circumstances, relating the actions of
the parties to the law . . . .”).
166. In perhaps the most famous scene in the classic film THE PAPER CHASE (Thompson
Films 1973), the movie’s protagonist is asked to “recite the facts of Hawkins versus McGee.” Id.
The facts he was expected to recite were “adjudicative facts,” background facts about what had
happened to the plaintiff to bring him into court—namely, that his hand had been injured, that
the doctor had made it worse when he operated, and that the plaintiff now sought compensation
for his “hairy hand.” Id. See generally Hawkins v. McGee, 146 A. 641 (N.H. 1929).
167. Faigman, supra note 165, at 552 (describing legislative facts as ones that “transcend the
particular dispute”); see also Alfange, supra note 165, at 640 (“[L]egislative facts . . . deal with
general problems and demonstrate a need for legislation . . . .”); Keeton, supra note 163, at 11
(“[Legislative] facts are foundation facts. They are building blocks in the foundation on which
the whole structure of reason is built for deciding cases. . . . [Legislative] facts, therefore, is
shorthand for facts that serve as premises for deciding an issue of law.”).
168. Kenneth L. Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 75,
99 (“[Legislative facts] look to the future. They tend to be facts which relate to other ‘cases’
which may never be decided.” (footnote omitted)).
169. The term “legislative facts” is sometimes used to refer to those facts that are found by
Congress in developing a record for the exercise of one of its enumerated powers. See, e.g.,
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 668 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“To the extent
‘legislative facts’ are relevant to a judicial determination, Congress is well equipped to
investigate them, and such determinations are of course entitled to due respect.”).
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they are used in the course of developing legal rules. Legislative
facts can take various forms; they might help the court understand the
171
172
history of a given practice, identify current realities, or make
predictions about the potential effects of legal rules that the court is
173
considering adopting. Although there will be many cases in which
174
legislative facts play no role at all, when such facts do play a role,
they are often critical.
In the Proposition 8 case, for example, legislative facts were
critical to the district court’s determination that there was no rational
basis for distinguishing between heterosexual and homosexual
marriage. Because the primary rationales offered in support of the
proposition were that children raised by heterosexual couples are
better off than children raised by homosexual couples and that
recognition of same-sex marriage would impair traditional
175
marriage,
the court’s factual findings focused on these two
questions. These were questions of legislative fact, as opposed to
adjudicative fact, because they focused not on any particular child or
on any particular heterosexual couple’s decision to marry, but rather
on the general effects of same-sex adoption on children and the
general effect of recognizing same-sex marriage on heterosexual
marriage. The district court ultimately concluded that the children of
176
same-sex couples benefit when their parents can marry, and that
“[p]ermitting same-sex couples to marry will not affect the number of
opposite-sex couples who marry, divorce, cohabit, have children

170. Some scholars have suggested that an alternative label is preferable to avoid confusion
with those facts found by a legislature. See, e.g., Keeton, supra note 163, at 9 n.22 (“I am
uneasy . . . about misunderstandings that may arise from using the term legislative facts to
describe not only those premises a legislature uses to enact a statute but also those that a court
uses for judicial lawmaking.”). Nevertheless, this remains the most common nomenclature.
171. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2790–99 (2008) (discussing
historical sources to elucidate the purported meaning of the Second Amendment).
172. See, e.g., Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2512 (2009)
(discussing “evidence that [section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006),]
fails to account for current political conditions”).
173. See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2549–50 (2009) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the consequences of the majority’s opinion recognizing that lab analysts
are “witnesses” within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment).
174. Davis, Judicial Notice, supra note 162, at 952 (“In the great mass of cases decided by
courts and by agencies, the legislative element is either absent, unimportant, or interstitial,
because in most cases the applicable law and policy have been previously established.”).
175. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 931 (N.D. Cal.), appeal pending, No. 1016696, 2010 WL 3212786 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2010).
176. Id. at 973.
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outside of marriage, or otherwise affect the stability of opposite-sex
177
marriages.”
These factual findings, and others compiled by the district court,
provided the basis for its legal conclusions. For example, when the
court concluded that there was no rational basis to support the state’s
discrimination between same-sex and opposite-sex couples, it relied
on its factual findings, including its determination that “[t]he evidence
shows that the state advances nothing when it adheres to the tradition
178
of excluding same-sex couples from marriage.” A district court that
viewed these facts differently almost certainly would have viewed the
law differently as well.
In the cases discussed in Part II, in which appellate courts looked
outside the record to make factual findings, those facts were also
legislative facts; they helped the courts formulate and apply legal
rules by enabling them to better understand general facts about the
world, as opposed to facts specific to the parties. For example, in
Citizens United, the Court was concerned not with whether any
particular corporation was burdened by its requirement to speak
through a PAC, but with whether the requirement was generally so
179
burdensome that it could be considered an outright ban on speech.
And the Court was concerned not with whether any particular
expenditure caused corruption, but with whether expenditures
generally cause corruption such that the government’s anticorruption
rationale would be a compelling interest sufficient to justify the First
180
Amendment restriction. Likewise, in the abortion cases I previously
discussed, the Court was focused not on any particular woman, but on
181
the general physical and emotional consequences of abortions.
That courts must look to such facts is unsurprising. The
establishment of any legal rule requires some understanding of the
world in which that legal rule will operate; otherwise it is impossible
to determine what its consequences will be and whether its

177. Id. at 972.
178. Id. at 998; see also id. (concluding that the “[p]roponents’ asserted state interests in
tradition are nothing more than tautologies and do not amount to rational bases for Proposition
8”). The same findings supported the district court’s conclusion that Proposition 8 violated the
plaintiffs’ rights to due process. Id. at 994–95.
179. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 897 (2010) (discussing the “burdensome” nature
of speaking through a PAC).
180. Id. at 909 (discussing the connection between independent expenditures and
corruption).
181. See supra notes 128–140 and accompanying text.
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182

implementation makes sense. As one commentator has noted, “The
ingredients of all lawmaking have to be policy ideas and facts, but the
policy ideas are necessarily dependent, immediately or remotely, on
183
facts.” It is no wonder, then, that the case law is replete with
examples of court decisions—including significant ones in which the
courts are settling highly contested legal issues—that turn on
184
questions of legislative fact.
This distinction between adjudicative and legislative facts helps
explain why the legal system’s adversarial commitment is often more
myth than reality in the context of appellate factfinding. When
legislative facts are at issue, adverse parties have less of an advantage
over nonparties in presenting the facts because the relevant facts are
185
not uniquely within the parties’ knowledge. Moreover, when
legislative facts are at issue, it generally means the court is deciding a
significant legal question that will have an impact that extends beyond
the adverse parties. In such cases, other individuals and entities will
often have an interest in advising the courts. As a result, rules and
practices adopted for adjudicative facts make far less sense in the

182. See Jeffrey M. Shaman, Constitutional Fact: The Perception of Reality by the Supreme
Court, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 236, 236 (1983) (“Constitutional decisions, like all other legal
decisions, are made by judges based upon their understanding of the world around them. Thus,
constitutional law is determined by the judicial perception of factual reality.” (footnote
omitted)); cf. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DUKE L.J. 511, 515 (“[T]he ‘traditional tools of statutory construction’ include not merely text
and legislative history but also, quite specifically, the consideration of policy consequences.”
(emphasis added)).
183. Kenneth Culp Davis, Facts in Lawmaking, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 931, 931 (1980); see also
Davis, Judicial Notice, supra note 162, at 949 (“A human being is probably unable to consider a
problem—whether of fact, law, policy, judgment, or discretion—without using his past
experience, much of which may be factual and much highly disputable.”).
184. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327–33 (2003) (relying on legislative facts
about the effect of diversity on higher education to conclude that diversity was a compelling
interest that could justify some race-conscious admissions policies).
185. This is not to say that adverse parties can never—or do not ever—present the courts
with legislative fact information. They undoubtedly do. Indeed, the famous “Brandeis brief,”
the brief in which Louis Brandeis “assembled all of the extant social science research on the
detrimental impact of long work hours on the health of women,” was the brief for the defendant
state of Oregon in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig,
The Supreme Court and Junk Social Science: Selective Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L.
REV. 91, 93 n.5 (1993); see also Marion E. Doro, The Brandeis Brief, 11 VAND. L. REV. 783
(1958) (providing background on the “Brandeis brief”). My point is simply that adverse parties
do not have the same advantage over nonparties when legislative facts are at issue as they do
when adjudicative facts are. Of course, even the adversarial presentation of legislative facts can
be a distortion of our traditional adversarial process when those facts are presented for the first
time before an appellate court. See supra Part I.C.
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context of legislative facts, and courts become more likely to look to
186
extra-record facts in such cases. Thus, the distinction between
adjudicative and legislative facts helps explain why appellate court
extra-record factfinding is pervasive and why, in that respect, the
United States’ commitment to an adversarial system of justice is more
myth than reality.
B. Legislative Facts Let Loose
Although adjudicative and legislative facts are both important in
the resolution of legal disputes, they are meaningfully different, and
187
they play very different roles. Given this reality, one might think
that two sets of practices, procedures, and rules would be in place:
one for adjudicative facts and one for legislative facts. Yet that is not
188
the case. Indeed, whereas rules and guidelines are in place to govern
189
the former, the latter remain the subject of considerable confusion.

186. For a discussion of cases involving legislative facts in which appellate courts looked
outside the record, see supra Part II.A.
187. See Frederick Schauer & Virginia J. Wise, Legal Positivism as Legal Information, 82
CORNELL L. REV. 1080, 1108 (1997) (“[S]tarting in 1991, there has been a substantial and
continuing increase in the Court’s citation of nonlegal sources. . . . [O]ur preliminary and
informal examination indicates that there appear to be similar changes, although at lower levels
and with some time lag, in the United States Courts of Appeals, the United States District
Courts, the California Supreme Court, and the New York Court of Appeals.”).
188. Even Judge Robert Keeton, who claims that “the legal system has developed one set of
rules and practices for adjudicative facts and a different set of rules and practices for [legislative]
facts,” Keeton, supra note 163, at 14, seems to mean only that the courts regularly ignore the
rules for adjudicative facts when legislative facts are at issue, not that there is a well-established
set of rules and practices governing the development of legislative facts, id. at 23–24 & n.60
(citing Massachusetts Medical Society v. Dukakis, 815 F.2d 790 (1st Cir. 1986), for the
proposition that appellate courts need not defer to district courts’ resolution of legislative facts
and explaining that “[a]lthough the First Circuit did not adopt [his] identification of the issue as
a nonadjudicative, or [legislative], fact question, one may infer that it did not apply the rules of
law and practice that ordinarily apply to adjudicative facts”); cf. id. at 14 n.36 (“The precedents
and commentaries cited in support of other principles also implicitly support this principle.”).
189. See, e.g., James R. Acker, Social Science in Supreme Court Criminal Cases and Briefs:
The Actual and Potential Contribution of Social Scientists as Amici Curiae, 14 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 25, 26 (1990) (noting the “absence of formal procedures to assist the Court in locating
or evaluating social science and other social fact information”); Richard B. Cappalli, Bringing
Internet Information to Court: Of “Legislative Facts,” 75 TEMP. L. REV. 99, 103 (2002) (“No
rules circumscribe how judges may receive legislative facts, it being a matter of their absolute
discretion whether and how to consult them.”); Edward K. Cheng, Independent Judicial
Research in the Daubert Age, 56 DUKE L.J. 1263, 1290 (2007) (“Judicial notice of legislative
facts . . . is basically unregulated.”); Cheng, supra, at 1267 (“[T]he rules governing independent
research are astonishingly unclear.”); Cathy Cochran, Surfing the Web for a “Brandeis Brief”:
The Internet and Judicial Use of Legislative Facts, 70 TEX. B.J. 780, 781 (2007) (“Judicial notice
of legislative facts is limited only by a court’s own sense of propriety.”). In theory, ethical
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As Professor Davis observes about the Supreme Court in particular,
“[It] is a major lawmaker, but it has no procedure designed for
190
lawmaking.”
The Federal Rules, for example, provide some guidelines for
extra-record factfinding, but those guidelines apply only to
adjudicative facts, not legislative ones. Federal Rule of Evidence 201
provides that courts, “whether requested or not,” can take “judicial
notice” of a fact “not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either
(1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court
or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to
191
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” But the
rule explicitly provides that “[it] governs only judicial notice of
192
adjudicative facts.” Thus, the rule’s requirement that a party, “upon
timely request,” be given “an opportunity to be heard as to the
propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the matter
canons might affect how judges obtain legislative facts, see, e.g., Elizabeth G. Thornburg, The
Curious Appellate Judge: Ethical Limits on Independent Research, 28 REV. LITIG. 131, 135
(2008) (discussing the Model Code of Judicial Conduct), but in reality they operate as little
constraint, see id. at 136 (“By including the reference to judicial notice . . . the Model Code
opens a loophole. If the ethics rules are meant to incorporate the totality of federal and state
evidence rules’ approach to what judges can ‘know’ on their own, the research prohibition is a
narrow one.”).
190. Davis, supra note 47, at 5; see also id. at 7 (“[Courts] always have the needed
adjudicative facts, that is, the facts about the immediate parties—who did what, where, when,
how, and with what motive or intent. But courts often have inadequate legislative facts, that is,
the facts that bear on the court’s choices about law and policy.”); cf. Usery v. Tamiami Trail
Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 245 (5th Cir. 1976) (“Though a court, with its adversary procedure, is
not necessarily precluded from resolving issues of legislative fact, it is generally thought that
their determination is particularly appropriate to the administrative process, where staffs of
specialists and great storehouses of information are available.” (citation omitted)).
191. FED. R. EVID. 201(b)–(c).
192. Id. 201(a); see also United States v. Gould, 536 F.2d 216, 219 (8th Cir. 1976) (“Rule
201 . . . was deliberately drafted to cover only a small fraction of material usually subsumed
under the concept of ‘judicial notice.’” (omission in original) (quoting JACK B. WEINSTEIN,
MARGARET A. BERGER & JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, 1 WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE ¶ 201[01], at
201-15 (1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The
Federal Rules of Evidence After Sixteen Years—The Effect of “Plain Meaning” Jurisprudence,
the Need for an Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective
Revision of the Rules, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 857, 899 (1992) (“The Rules’ failure to address
legislative facts has been criticized as too narrow and unambitious. This lack of guidance has led
to concerns surrounding the process for noticing legislative facts.” (footnote omitted)); Pieter S.
de Ganon, Note, Noticing Crisis, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 573, 574 (2011) (“Judges take judicial notice
of facts they deem relevant to a particular case. They may take judicial notice of ‘adjudicative
facts’ . . . only when such ‘facts are outside the area of reasonable controversy.’ But no such sine
qua non governs ‘legislative facts’ . . . . The scope of legislative facts is practically unlimited:
Judges may invoke any legislative fact they choose, unconstrained by rules of evidence or
procedure.” (quoting FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee’s note)).
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193

noticed” does not apply to legislative facts. As the Advisory
Committee notes explain, “[A]ny limitation in the form of
indisputability, any formal requirements of notice other than those
already inherent in affording opportunity to hear and be heard and
exchanging briefs, and any requirement of formal findings at any
194
level” would be inappropriate for legislative facts.
The appropriate standard for appellate review of adjudicative
195
facts is also clear, but with respect to legislative facts, the question
remains an open one. The Supreme Court has suggested that the
typically deferential standard of review applicable to factual findings
196
might not apply to “legislative findings,” and some courts of appeals
197
have taken the Court up on that suggestion.
Moreover, even if courts of appeals are to review legislative facts
de novo, the case law provides no framework for how they should do
so. There are no procedures designed to ensure the quality of the
sources on which the courts rely or to ensure that all views are
adequately tested. Indeed, in the administrative context, courts have
sometimes justified an administrative official’s decision to look
outside the submissions of the parties on the ground that he was only
developing legislative facts, but even in these cases, the courts have

193. FED. R. EVID. 201(e).
194. Id. 201(a) advisory committee’s note; see also id. (noting that judges who are
attempting to determine domestic law “may make an independent search for persuasive data”
and that “[t]his is the view which should govern judicial access to legislative facts”).
195. See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text.
196. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 168 n.3 (1986) (“[Respondent] argues that the
‘factual’ findings of the District Court and the Eighth Circuit on the effects of ‘death
qualification’ may be reviewed by this Court only under the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). Because we do not ultimately base our decision today on
the invalidity of the lower courts’ ‘factual’ findings, we need not decide the ‘standard of review’
issue. We are far from persuaded, however, that the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard of Rule 52(a)
applies to the kind of ‘legislative’ facts at issue here. The difficulty with applying such a standard
to ‘legislative’ facts is evidenced here by the fact that at least one other Court of Appeals,
reviewing the same social science studies as introduced by [Respondent], has reached a
conclusion contrary to that of the Eighth Circuit.” (citation omitted)).
197. See, e.g., Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 135 n.24 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that the Second
Circuit “may ultimately undertake de novo review of any legislative facts found by the District
Court on remand”), rev’d sub nom. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006); United States v.
Singleterry, 29 F.3d 733, 740 (1st Cir. 1994) (“The clear error standard does not apply, however,
when the fact-finding at issue concerns ‘legislative,’ as opposed to ‘historical’ facts.”); In re
Asbestos Litig., 829 F.2d 1233, 1252 n.11 (3d Cir. 1987) (Becker, J., concurring) (“Because the
determination of legislative facts is thus a component of fashioning a rule of law, the clearly
erroneous standard of Rule 52(a) does not apply to review of a federal court’s findings
concerning legislative facts.”).
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neglected to provide more general guidelines for how legislative facts
198
should be found and how disputes about them should be resolved.
The one context in which courts of appeals have recently given
sustained attention to the distinction between adjudicative and
199
legislative facts is in cases regarding abortion restrictions. Although
the courts seem to agree that general facts about the availability of
abortions and the medical necessity of particular procedures are
legislative facts, there is little agreement about what that classification
means in terms of how appellate courts should go about finding those
facts or reviewing the factual findings of district courts.
200
In Hope Clinic v. Ryan, the Seventh Circuit considered the
constitutionality of two state laws prohibiting partial-birth abortions:
one district court had held an Illinois statute unconstitutional,
whereas another district court had held a similar Wisconsin statute
201
constitutional. The Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, concluded that
both statutes could be applied in a constitutional manner depending
202
on how they were construed by their respective state courts.
Nevertheless, it granted the plaintiffs injunctive relief, limiting the
statutes’ application to the “medical procedure that each state insists
203
is its sole concern.” In reaching this result, the court concluded that
the statutes, as limited to a specific procedure, would not unduly
204
burden the right to abortion. It relied primarily on the factual

198. See, e.g., Zamora v. INS, 534 F.2d 1055, 1062 (2d Cir. 1976) (“The attitude of the
country of prospective deportation toward various types of former residents is a question of
legislative fact, on which the safeguards of confrontation and cross-examination are not
required and on which the [immigration judge] needs all the help he can get.”).
199. In a line of cases, primarily from the 1970s, the courts also invoked the distinction to
determine whether an administrative proceeding was properly viewed as an adjudication or a
rulemaking. See, e.g., Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 467–68 (1983) (“The second inquiry
requires the Secretary [of Health and Human Services] to determine an issue that is not unique
to each claimant—the types and numbers of jobs that exist in the national economy. This type of
general factual issue may be resolved as fairly through rulemaking as by introducing the
testimony of vocational experts at each disability hearing.”); Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers v. FTC,
627 F.2d 1151, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (concluding that the proceeding at issue was a rulemaking
because, in large part, it was “directed to all members of an affected industry and [was] based on
legislative fact”).
200. Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1999) (en banc), vacated, 530 U.S. 1271
(2000).
201. Id. at 861.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 871.
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findings of the Wisconsin district court, but buttressed those findings
205
with citations to additional studies.
In dissent, Judge Richard Posner maintained that he had
no objection to a court’s relying on extra-record evidence to
determine the health effects of “partial birth” abortion. Those
effects should indeed be treated as a legislative fact rather than an
adjudicative fact, in order to avoid inconsistent results arising from
the reactions of different district judges, sheltered by the deferential
“clear error” standard of appellate review of factfindings, to
different records—the inconsistency illustrated by the different
206
findings of [the two judges] in the two cases before us.

Yet, he further observed, “[W]e should hesitate to play statistician. It
is incongruous for this court to brush aside the findings of district
judges in other cases while bolstering [the Wisconsin judge’s]
207
inadequate findings with extra-record evidence of its own.” Further,
even though the question
is rightly an issue of legislative fact, meaning that its resolution is not
to be cabined by facts determined in an adjudicative hearing; still it
must be resolved in accordance with the weight of the evidence,
including such extra-record evidence as the consensus of the
208
relevant expert community, in this case the medical community.

Appellate court cases in this area have focused on not only
appellate courts’ freedom to review lower court factual findings, but
also appellate courts’ freedom to revisit Supreme Court factual
findings. Unsurprisingly, there is not a uniform view. According to
the Eighth Circuit, when the Supreme Court makes a finding of
legislative fact, such as “the medical necessity of a health
exception . . . , subsequent litigants need not relitigate [the]

205. Id. at 872.
206. Id. at 884 (Posner, J., dissenting); see also id. at 883 (“Consistent deference to district
court factfindings in this pair of cases would lead to an inconsistent result—the upholding of one
statute and the condemnation of its sister. This demonstrates that the constitutional right of
abortion cannot be made to depend on whether a particular district judge finds a particular
physician who disagrees with the consensus of medical opinion to be more credible than the
spokesmen for the consensus.”).
207. Id. at 884.
208. Id. at 885. Judge Posner criticized the majority’s suggestion that the statutes could be
upheld so long as there was some “real, and not just hypothetical, support for a belief that the
partial-birth-abortion laws do not pose hazards [to] maternal health.” Id. (quoting id. at 873
(majority opinion)).
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209

question[].” Thus, in light of a Supreme Court decision that was
then just five years old, the Eighth Circuit concluded that a ban on
210
partial-birth abortions required a health exception. Although the
Eighth Circuit’s trust in the consistency of Supreme Court factual
211
findings may have been misplaced, other courts have adopted this
212
view. The Seventh Circuit, however, while suggesting that it
probably should consider the Court’s findings of legislative fact
213
binding, nonetheless declined to do so, deciding instead to “review
the evidence in [the record before it]” because “the Supreme Court
214
ha[d] not made this point explicit.” The Second Circuit, too, has
215
taken this view.
From these conflicting opinions, a few points emerge. First, many
appellate courts view themselves as free to review legislative facts de
novo, lest different courts adopt different positions on issues as to
which there should be uniformity. As the Eighth Circuit explained,
[A]ppellate courts can impose uniformity within their jurisdictions
by according no deference to a lower court’s record-based
conclusions. Indeed, adopting a deferential posture in such

209. Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791, 800 (8th Cir. 2005), rev’d, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); see
also id. at 802 (“There is some evidence in the present record indicating . . . the banned
procedures are never medically necessary. There were, however, such assertions in Stenberg as
well.” (citation omitted)).
210. Id. at 796–97.
211. The Supreme Court subsequently reversed the Eighth Circuit’s decision. Gonzales v.
Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007).
212. See, e.g., Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Hicks, 409 F.3d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 2005)
(“Carhart established the health exception requirement as a per se constitutional rule. This rule
is based on substantial medical authority (from a broad array of sources) recognized by the
Supreme Court, and this body of medical authority does not have to be reproduced in every
subsequent challenge to a ‘partial birth abortion’ statute lacking a health exception.”), vacated
sub nom. Herring v. Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women, 550 U.S. 901 (2007).
213. A Woman’s Choice–E. Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684, 688 (7th Cir.
2002) (“[I]f the issue is one of legislative rather than adjudicative fact, it is unsound to say that,
on records very similar in nature, [one] law could be valid . . . and [one] invalid, just because
different district judges reached different conclusions about the inferences to be drawn from the
same body of statistical work.”).
214. Id.; see also Hicks, 409 F.3d at 632 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Supreme
Court did not apply a per se rule but instead concluded that the “findings and evidence” in the
record supported the view that a health exception was required).
215. Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 278, 287 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Stenberg does not
leave it to a legislature (state or federal) to make a finding as to whether a statute prohibiting an
abortion procedure constitutionally requires a health exception. On the contrary, Stenberg
leaves it to the challenger of the statute . . . to point to evidence of ‘substantial medical
authority’ that supports the view that the procedure might sometimes be necessary to avoid risk
to a woman’s health.”), vacated, 224 F. App’x 88 (2d Cir. 2007).
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circumstances could lead to the absurd result where two district
courts within the same circuit . . . might examine the same body of
evidence and reach different conclusions as to the medical necessity
of the partial-birth abortion procedures, but we would be forced to
216
affirm both because the question is a close one.

Of course, exactly what constitutes a legislative fact remains
somewhat unclear: for example, the Seventh Circuit held that a
district court’s conclusions about studies were entitled to deference,
217
but not its conclusions about the “significance” of those studies.
Second, and related, even if review of legislative facts need not
be as deferential as review of adjudicative facts, there is little
consensus on how active appellate courts should be in engaging in
that review. An appellate court might, as Judge Posner suggested,
decide that it is no better positioned than the court below to assess
218
conflicting statistical studies. As Judge Diane Wood noted in one of
these abortion cases,
It is unclear at best to me why the two judges in the majority on this
panel think that they know better than the district court judge, who
heard all the testimony and weighed all the evidence, what the
answer is to the question whether a critical number of Indiana
women would experience the [statutory restriction] as such a
significant burden that it would effectively prevent them from
219
exercising their constitutionally protected choice.

That said, one can query whether Judge Posner or Judge Wood would
still have been hesitant to second-guess the district court if they had
220
disagreed with its findings.
Third, there is a real danger when judges, inexperienced in
making empirical judgments and unrestrained in how they do so, are
forced to make factual determinations that are highly contestable and

216. Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791, 799 (8th Cir. 2005), rev’d, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); see
also id. at 800 (suggesting that “constitutional uniformity” can best be achieved by “treat[ing]
the issue as one of legislative fact”); Newman, 305 F.3d at 688 (“[C]onstitutionality must be
assessed at the level of legislative fact, rather than adjudicative fact determined by more than
650 district judges.”); cf. Newman, 305 F.3d at 689 (“Th[e] admixture of fact and law, sometimes
called an issue of ‘constitutional fact,’ is reviewed without deference in order to prevent the
idiosyncrasies of a single judge or jury from having far-reaching legal effects.”).
217. Newman, 305 F.3d at 689.
218. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
219. Newman, 305 F.3d at 711 (Wood, J., dissenting).
220. Cf. id. at 715 (concluding that the district court’s findings should stand whether
reviewed de novo or under an abuse-of-discretion standard).
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ideologically laden without any guidelines. This is particularly true
when many of the “studies” on which courts might be tempted to rely
221
arguably reflect the ideological biases of their authors. In Hope
Clinic, Judge Posner criticized the majority’s review of extra-record
evidence, noting that it relied on one article, which was “not a
medical paper at all,” and another that was focused primarily on the
“ethical issues involved in abortion,” while ignoring entirely another
article in the same issue of the journal that reached the opposite
222
conclusion. In A Woman’s Choice–East Side Women’s Clinic v.
223
Newman, Judge John Coffey criticized the trial court for basing its
factual findings on “a faulty study by biased researchers who operated
224
in a vacuum of speculation.”
Fourth, and perhaps most significantly, there is real confusion
225
about how the courts should treat legislative facts. As I noted at the
outset, the courts have not adopted established practices for dealing
with legislative facts and, as a result, the distinction between
adjudicative and legislative facts is often ignored. It is perhaps a
surprising state of affairs given the prevalence of legislative facts. In
the next Section, I offer an explanation for why this might be.
C. Willful Ignorance of Legislative Facts
Legislative facts are, in some sense, the proverbial elephant in
the room—no one points or stares, even though chaos could ensue at
226
any moment. This lack of attention is, I argue, somewhat willful,
even if not intentional. If courts were to recognize that legislative
facts often play an important role in their decisions, then they would
also have to recognize why legislative facts are important—namely,
that courts are sometimes required to develop legal rules in a way
221. See Ellie Margolis, Beyond Brandeis: Exploring the Uses of Non-Legal Materials in
Appellate Briefs, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 197, 232 (2000) (“Non-legal information itself may be the
product of biased, advocacy-driven research.”).
222. Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 884 (7th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (Posner, J.,
dissenting), vacated, 530 U.S. 1271 (2000).
223. A Woman’s Choice–E. Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2002).
224. Id. at 694 (Coffey, J., concurring) (“[T]he ‘key’ piece of evidence relied upon by the
district court was a study published in the . . . Journal of the American Medical Association [and]
co-authored by a statistician employed by the Planned Parenthood-affiliated Alan Guttmacher
Institute.” (quoting id. at 713 (Wood, J., dissenting))).
225. See supra notes 200–224 and accompanying text.
226. The abortion cases just discussed are the exception that proves the rule; there are few
other judicial opinions that give the same sustained attention to how courts should treat
legislative facts.
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that necessitates evaluation of the same kind of information
227
considered by legislators. For institutions that are committed to
228
such
maintaining a more limited conception of their role,
recognition could prompt nothing short of an existential crisis.
The history of scholarly recognition of the distinction between
adjudicative and legislative facts is telling. Professor Davis discusses
the distinction at length in his seminal work on the administrative
229
process. In setting out a number of “broad tentative principles” to
assist agencies in developing processes for handling problems of
evidence, he writes that “[t]he rules of evidence for finding facts
which form the basis for creation of law and determination of policy
should differ from the rules for finding facts which concern only the
230
parties to a particular case.” He explains that “[w]hen an agency
finds facts concerning immediate parties—what the parties did, what
the circumstances were, what the background conditions were—the
agency is performing an adjudicative function, and the facts may
231
conveniently be called adjudicative facts.” By contrast, “[w]hen an
agency wrestles with a question of law or policy, it is acting
legislatively, just as judges have created the common law through
judicial legislation, and the facts which inform its legislative judgment
232
may conveniently be denominated legislative facts.”
“The
distinction is important,” he explains, because “the traditional rules of
evidence are designed for adjudicative facts, and unnecessary
confusion results from attempting to apply the traditional rules to
233
legislative facts.”
Thus, the distinction between these two types of facts was first
made in the context of the administrative process, where agencies

227. See Davis, supra note 47, at 1 (“Even though the Constitution explicitly puts the
legislative power in Congress, judicial legislation is so deeply established that the legal
profession takes it for granted, as though nature provided it.”).
228. See, e.g., id. (noting that “criticism of judicial lawmaking is plentiful”).
229. Davis, Problems of Evidence, supra note 162, at 402–03. Professor Kenneth Culp
Davis’s work focuses on “problems of evidence in the administrative process,” and his
discussion of the distinction between adjudicative and legislative facts thus examines their role
in administrative adjudication, not in judicial decisionmaking. Id.
230. Id. at 402.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 402–03; see also id. at 402 (“Frequently agencies’ choices of law or policy must
depend on fact-finding. But the fact-finding process for such purposes is different from the
process of finding facts which concern only the parties to a particular case and calls for different
rules of evidence.”).
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explicitly engage in both adjudication and rulemaking. Courts, by
contrast, are traditionally—and erroneously—thought to be in the
business of only adjudication, not rulemaking, and they thus have
been unwilling to acknowledge that they need facts that are relevant
to the latter task. To be sure, subsequent scholars have acknowledged
that the distinction is also relevant to the work of courts, but scholars
are much more willing than courts—particularly contemporary
234
courts —to acknowledge that courts not only apply law, but also
235
make it.
As a result, even though as a descriptive matter, legislative facts
often are—and have been—critical to court decisions, courts often fail
to explicitly recognize that their decisions about legal rules are
turning on legislative facts. Whatever the explanation for the courts’
failure to grapple with the pervasive role of legislative facts in judicial
decisionmaking may be, the consequences of that failure are
significant—perhaps as significant as the influence of legislative facts
themselves. As I discuss in the next Part, the courts’ failure to

234. The mere suggestion by Supreme Court nominee Sonia Sotomayor that unelected
judges do, in fact, make policy was the source of considerable controversy during her
confirmation battle. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, A Judge’s View of Judging Is on the Record, N.Y.
TIMES, May 15, 2009, at A21 (discussing then-Judge Sotomayor’s public statements regarding
the role of judges); see also Emmett S. Collazo, Applying the Rule of Law Subjectively: How
Appellate Courts Adjudicate, 4 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 303, 304 (2008) (“A ritual is enacted
whenever a nominee for a federal judgeship appears before the Senate Judiciary Committee as
part of the confirmation process. One Senator will ask, ‘Do you intend to apply the law rather
than make it?’ Another will ask, ‘Will you apply the words of the Constitution in the way that
the framers intended?’ Nominees, some of whom ought to know better, play their part in the
ritual by answering ‘Yes’ to both questions.”); Stephen Reinhardt, Life to Death: Our
Constitution and How It Grows, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 391, 395 (2010) (“This vision of the
judiciary as little more than umpires or referees at sporting events has become so pervasive that
even jurists who would never contemplate describing themselves as conservatives are now
rushing to establish their credentials as unmoved and unmoving enforcers of the proscribed
rules and procedures.”).
235. See, e.g., George D. Brown, Political Judges and Popular Justice: A Conservative
Victory or a Conservative Dilemma?, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1543, 1601 (2008) (“Common
law courts are certainly engaged in the business of making law and policy. . . . [A]nyone who
contends otherwise is falling into the trap of magisterial visions of the judiciary that have been
discredited by legal realism and the work of political scientists.”); David Luban, Justice Holmes
and the Metaphysics of Judicial Restraint, 44 DUKE L.J. 449, 504 (1994) (“[T]he fundamental
insight of [Holmes’s] legal realism is that judges can make and unmake law (though they
customarily deny that this is what they are doing) . . . .”); Scot W. Anderson, Note, Surveying the
Realm: Description and Adjudication in Law’s Empire, 73 IOWA L. REV. 131, 133 (1987) (“In
contrast to the declaratory theory of the natural lawyer, legal realism holds that judges only
make law and never find law.”). But see Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Realism of Judges Past and
Present, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 77, 78–80 (2009) (arguing that “judges have long admitted that
they make law”).
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forthrightly acknowledge the role of legislative facts manifests itself in
their decisionmaking and in their presentation of those decisions. It
also means that insufficient attention has been paid to a more
fundamental question: Are the rules and procedures that have been
developed for resolving cases that turn primarily on adjudicative facts
appropriate for cases that turn instead on legislative facts? I consider
each of these issues in turn.
IV. THE TROUBLING CONSEQUENCES OF THE ADVERSARIAL MYTH
As previously noted, the distinction between adjudicative and
legislative facts has received relatively little attention in the academic
literature and even less in the case law. Even if unsurprising, the
courts’ disinterest is troubling. The courts’ failure to recognize the
distinction between adjudicative and legislative facts is largely
responsible for the aspect of the adversarial myth that is the focus of
this Article—appellate courts’ purported commitment to an
adversarial system of justice, even as they rely on extra-record facts
presented by nonparties. And that myth has profound implications
for the ways in which the courts resolve factual disputes and present
the resolution of those disputes to the public. In this Part, I discuss
several of the most troubling aspects of the courts’ persistent belief in
the adversarial myth.
A. Unfounded Assumptions
It is often said that everyone is entitled to his own opinion, but
236
not to his own facts. The difference between opinion and fact,
237
however, is often subtle. Value judgments often depend, to greater
or lesser degrees, on the resolution of empirical questions about the
larger world, and people often assume the answers to such questions
unless they are confronted with objective evidence that their
238
assumptions are unfounded. When a case turns largely on
236. The expression originated with the late Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York.
Steven R. Weisman, Introduction to DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN: A PORTRAIT IN LETTERS
OF AN AMERICAN VISIONARY 1, 2 (Steven R. Weisman ed., 2010).
237. Cf. Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous
Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601,
660 n.305 (1990) (“The legal interpretation of the fact/opinion distinction will . . . ultimately
reflect our understanding of our own culture’s separation from nature.”).
238. Cf. John Veilleux, Note, The Scientific Model in Law, 75 GEO. L.J. 1967, 1990 (1987)
(“Legal scholars and parties to litigation increasingly draw on empirical evidence to challenge
the assumptions underlying legal rules and to influence factfinding by courts.”).
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adjudicative—as opposed to legislative—facts, the trier of fact is less
likely to have preconceived notions about the factual questions that
underlie a decision, at least outside of certain highly publicized cases,
in which media accounts might inform the trier’s understanding of
what happened. Indeed, in such highly publicized cases, there are
often motions to change venue precisely so that the triers of fact will
not come into the case with preconceived notions about what
239
happened.
Yet when cases turn on legislative facts, judges—whether they
recognize it or not—are far more likely to have preconceived views
about those facts. Public opinion polls show that most Americans
have views on the empirical questions that underlie some of the most
high-profile cases that are currently working their way through the
legal system. For example, people tend to have opinions about
whether children are, generally speaking, affected by being raised by
a same-sex couple, or whether the service of openly gay, lesbian, and
240
bisexual individuals in the military will affect unit cohesion. There is
no reason to think that judges will not also have preformed views on
241
these types of factual questions.

239. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 21(a) (“Upon the defendant’s motion, the court must transfer the
proceeding against that defendant to another district if the court is satisfied that so great a
prejudice against the defendant exists in the transferring district that the defendant cannot
obtain a fair and impartial trial there.”).
240. Cf. Same-Sex Marriage, Gay Rights, POLLINGREPORT.COM, http://www.pollingreport
.com/civil.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2011) (reporting polling results on public views on same-sex
marriage and the service of openly gay and lesbian individuals in the military).
241. See, e.g., Miller & Barron, supra note 41, at 1222 (“The Justices bring certain
predilections, sometimes known and sometimes unknown, to the decisional process.”); David F.
Levi, Autocrat of the Armchair, 58 DUKE L.J. 1791, 1794 (2009) (reviewing RICHARD A.
POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008)) (“Political and personal factors, according to Posner,
generate preconceptions, often unconscious, that affect judicial decision making.” (citing
POSNER, supra, at 11)); cf. In re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 651 (2d Cir. 1943) (Frank, J.)
(“If . . . ‘bias’ and ‘partiality’ be defined to mean the total absence of preconceptions in the mind
of the judge, then no one has ever had a fair trial and no one ever will. The human mind, even at
infancy, is no blank piece of paper. We are born with predispositions; and the process of
education, formal and informal, creates attitudes in all men which affect them in judging
situations, attitudes which precede reasoning in particular instances and which, therefore, by
definition, are pre-judices.”); Karst, supra note 168, at 84 (“[A]ll of [these questions of
legislative fact relevant to a case] are answered, whether or not the judge recognizes what he is
doing. If he does not hear testimony or receive memoranda illuminating these questions, he
assumes their answers on the basis of his own experience and education.”); Frank S. Ravitch,
Can an Old Dog Learn New Tricks? A Nonfoundationalist Analysis of Richard Posner’s The
Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 37 TULSA L. REV. 967, 975 (2002) (book review)
(“Society is more likely to accept decisions made based on empirical approaches and data, and
the judge is more likely to question his or her preconceptions when confronted with empirical
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The fact that judges have these preformed views is not
necessarily problematic. Indeed, if it were a problem, it would likely
be an insoluble one: selecting only individuals who pay no attention
to the world around them would hardly be an ideal way to put
together a strong judiciary. But it becomes problematic when those
preformed views become the basis for a court’s decision in a case. To
put it slightly differently, when a case turns on adjudicative facts,
there is generally little question about the relevance of those facts.
For example, in a murder case, most jurors will recognize the
centrality of the fact that the victim was killed between 9:45 and
10:15 p.m. and that someone was seen leaving the scene at 10:00 p.m.
As a result, these facts will be thoroughly tested during the course of
the trial. In the context of cases involving legislative facts, however,
judges may not recognize that factual findings susceptible to empirical
investigation are central to their ultimate legal conclusions. For
example, in the same murder case, if there were evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, the court would need to decide
242
whether that evidence should be excluded from trial, a decision that
ultimately turns on whether exclusion would “result[] in appreciable
243
deterrence.” The question of whether excluding certain evidence
will “result[] in appreciable deterrence” can be answered only with
reference to subsidiary empirical questions about police behavior and

data or when adopting an empirical approach to decision making.”). There is reason to think,
for example, that Justice Jackson’s pragmatic view of executive power was the result of his own
experience as attorney general. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“That comprehensive and undefined presidential
powers hold both practical advantages and grave dangers for the country will impress anyone
who has served as legal adviser to a President in time of transition and public anxiety. While an
interval of detached reflection may temper teachings of that experience, they probably are a
more realistic influence on my views than the conventional materials of judicial decision which
seem unduly to accentuate doctrine and legal fiction.”). See generally NOAH FELDMAN,
SCORPIONS: THE BATTLES AND TRIUMPHS OF FDR’S GREAT SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 354–
70 (2010) (discussing Youngstown).
242. See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 699 (2009) (“The Fourth Amendment
protects ‘[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures,’ but ‘contains no provision expressly precluding the
use of evidence obtained in violation of its commands.’ Nonetheless, our decisions establish an
exclusionary rule that, when applicable, forbids the use of improperly obtained evidence at
trial.” (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV; and Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S.
1, 10 (1995))).
243. Id. at 700 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909 (1984)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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244

what affects it. But it is less obvious that these subsidiary questions
are as central to the court’s legal conclusion as the adjudicative fact
question, which is central to a determination of the defendant’s guilt.
If judges are not conscious that they are making decisions that
turn on legislative facts, then they may rest their decisions on
assumptions—often unfounded assumptions—about the world
245
around them and the way it operates. As well educated and
informed as members of the judiciary may be, there is no reason to
think that they are well versed in all of the considerations that might
246
inform a decision that turns on these types of empirical questions.
When legislators are deciding whether to enact legislation, the
wisdom of which turns on empirical questions, they generally hold
247
hearings to determine whether the legislation would be helpful.
Courts often issue decisions that turn on the exact same questions,
but because they fail to recognize that their decisions are turning on
such factual questions, they do not engage in any attempt to gather
the relevant facts, even to the extent that their institutional resources
248
might allow them to do so. Thus, their opinions necessarily become
dependent upon guesswork, intuition, and general impressions. They

244. See, e.g., Leon, 468 U.S. at 927 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting that the adoption of
the exclusionary rule involved an “empirical judgment”).
245. See Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp. 1322, 1328 (E.D.N.Y. 1981)
(Weinstein, C.J.) (“[W]hether we explore the economic, political or social settings to which the
law must be applied explicitly, or suppress our assumptions by failing to take note of them, we
cannot apply the law in a way that has any hope of making sense unless we attempt to visualize
the actual world with which it interacts—and this effort requires judicial notice to educate the
court.”); Keeton, supra note 163, at 15 (“Judges do come to their roles of judging with
knowledge that has influence on their legal thinking. Descriptively that is so, whether it is
acknowledged or not.”).
246. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2769 (2011) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (“Experts debate the conclusions of all these studies. . . . I, like most judges, lack the
social science expertise to say definitively who is right.”); Gil Seinfeld, The Federal Courts as a
Franchise: Rethinking the Justifications for Federal Question Jurisdiction, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 95,
125 (2009) (“Because of the explosion of federal law, it has become impossible for generalist
judges sitting on federal district and circuit courts to develop specific expertise with respect to
many of the subjects that come before them.”).
247. See, e.g., Stephen F. Ross, Legislative Enforcement of Equal Protection, 72 MINN. L.
REV. 311, 363 n.204 (1987) (“[C]ommittee hearings provide an effective and useful means of
securing relevant facts . . . .”).
248. See, e.g., Davis, Judicial Notice, supra note 162, at 953 (“[T]he opinion which
specifically identifies extra-record materials used in creating law or in determining policy may
involve less reliance on extra-record information than the more conventional opinion
purporting to rest exclusively upon the record but which in reality is heavily dependent upon the
assumption of unproved facts that are left vague and unidentified.”).
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may assume that a particular belief is established “fact” even when
there is no basis for that assumption.
B. Lack of Rules and Regulations
Recognizing the significance of legislative facts will only get
courts so far in the absence of established procedures to guide them
in resolving legislative fact disputes. In the absence of such rules,
courts may simply make up the rules as they go along. Sometimes
courts make assumptions based on background knowledge and
249
understandings, and sometimes courts engage in their own research,
250
scouring historical records and social science reports. Sometimes
courts will look to another court’s resolution of the same or related
factual questions, even if there is no reason to think that the other
251
court was any better equipped to resolve the question. As discussed
in Part II.B, courts will often turn to amicus briefs that make factual
claims about the larger world. As the examples I discussed in the
prior Parts suggest, such reliance on extra-record facts frequently
happens in the most significant cases the courts confront.
As an initial matter, this lack of established rules and regulations
252
almost certainly creates inequities between litigants. Courts will
choose whether or not to engage in additional research based on the
topic of the case and the resource constraints facing the judge.
Sometimes a court will give parties an opportunity to respond to its
249. See Peggy C. Davis, “There Is a Book Out . . .”: An Analysis of Judicial Absorption of
Legislative Facts, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1542 (1987) (“[The] legal enshrinement [of
legislative facts] is casual and unselfconscious, and their assessment often superficial and skewed
by litigation imbalances.”).
250. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner & Albert H. Yoon, What Judges Think of the Quality of
Legal Representation, 63 STAN. L. REV. 317, 320 (2011) (“The majority of judges responded that
they engage in additional research to compensate for . . . disparities [in legal representation]
when they arise.”); see also Cochran, supra note 189, at 781 (“Because of the ease of finding
nonlegal information on the Internet, both practitioners and judges are referring to more
sociology, psychology, criminology, medical, and economics texts and journals and to more
nonacademic books, magazines, and newspapers.”). For a good discussion of “independent
judicial research,” see generally Cheng, supra note 189. Cheng argues that judges should be
“encouraged” to engage in independent research and notes that the judiciary is “extremely
divided” on the propriety of such activity: “roughly equal numbers of judges support[]
independent research enthusiastically, denounc[e] it vehemently, and appear[] undecided.” Id.
at 1266–67.
251. See, e.g., supra notes 119–120 and accompanying text.
252. See Thornburg, supra note 189, at 139 (“[D]ivergent views [regarding independent
research] may indicate that the nation’s judiciary is also divergent in its practices—different
litigants may be subject to differing treatment, often without even knowing it.”). Such inequities
can in turn hurt the legitimacy of the courts, which are supposed to treat all litigants the same.

GOROD IN PRINTER PROOF

58

10/6/2011 6:57:08 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:1

extra-record research, and sometimes it will not. There is no reason
the courts’ treatment of legislative facts should vary across cases and
litigants, but, in the absence of rules and guidelines governing the use
of such facts, variance is inevitable.
The absence of established rules and procedures also means that
courts will often not find the legislative facts that they need to reach
the proper result in a case. As one commentator has explained:
In a world in which parties had unlimited and equal resources,
relying on the parties to supply information relevant to a court’s
lawmaking function would be safe. . . . Real courts do not operate in
that ideal world, however, and the presentation of evidence can be
253
skewed by inadequate party resources or incentives.

To be sure, courts can—and often will—search out the relevant facts
themselves; yet even though courts may have the power to search out
the relevant facts, there is little reason to think that they will always
avail themselves of that power or be successful in doing so.
Finally, even when courts do attempt to find the relevant
legislative facts on their own, they do so without the benefit of
processes that will help ensure that those facts are accurate and
254
properly applied. As I noted at the outset, in a world of highly
contestable facts, judges cannot easily discern factual reality simply by
picking up a book. Yet virtually no attention has been paid to how
courts find “facts” when those facts are legislative in nature.
In theory, district courts are structured to allow for the taking of
255
evidence and the resolution of factual conflicts. Justice Scalia has
253. Id. at 188; see also Posner & Yoon, supra note 250, at 320 (noting that federal judges
perceive significant disparities in the quality of legal representation, particularly in the fields of
“immigration and civil rights”).
254. See, e.g., Rustad & Koenig, supra note 185, at 94–95 (“At trial, when statistical and
social science evidence is employed, ‘it will be the subject of expert testimony and
knowledgeable cross-examination from both sides.’ Amicus briefs are not subject to the same
safeguards.” (quoting Wilkins v. Univ. of Hous., 654 F.2d 388, 403 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated, 459
U.S. 809 (1982))); see also id. at 113 (“The Court routinely receives social science information in
amicus as well as main briefs without subjecting it to quality control.”).
255. One can query, of course, whether district courts are structured to allow for the
resolution of legislative facts, as opposed to adjudicative facts. Professor Davis, while
recognizing that trial courts are better positioned to engage in such inquiries than appellate
courts, see Davis, supra note 47, at 11 (“When legislative facts are needed for a sound decision, a
trial court can do better than an appellate court, because it is free to take evidence on questions
of legislative facts. Some trial courts do so, with desirable results.”), nonetheless recognizes that
they are not especially well equipped to do so either, see id. (“[T]he normal evidence-taking
process may be a total misfit for legislative facts. . . . As the law [regarding the Federal Rules of
Evidence] was interpreted, the court was barred from considering precisely the kind of
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pointed to this fact in arguing that factual development should occur
before trial courts, and not in Supreme Court briefs: “An adversarial
process in the trial courts can identify flaws in the methodology of the
studies that the parties put forward; here, we accept the studies’
256
findings on faith, without examining their methodology at all.” In
the context of adjudicative facts, this structure often entails
competing witnesses and cross-examination. In the context of
legislative facts, this structure often means not only competing
witnesses and cross-examination, but also strict standards that govern
257
whether the evidence is admissible. It is unclear why procedural
safeguards are considered more necessary at the district court level
than at the appellate court level. If anything, one might think the
opposite would be true, especially when the comparison is between
adjudicative facts at the district court level and legislative facts at the
appellate court level. Legislative facts will often be more complicated
than adjudicative facts, and the resolution of any legislative fact will
information that was most helpful and most needed.”). But as some judges have noted, there are
ways for trial courts to more creatively engage in the discovery of legislative facts. See, e.g., Gen.
Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 149 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[A]s cases presenting
significant science-related issues have increased in number, judges have increasingly found in
the Rules of Evidence and Civil Procedure ways to help them overcome the inherent difficulty
of making determinations about complicated scientific, or otherwise technical, evidence. Among
these techniques are an increased use of Rule 16’s pretrial conference authority to narrow the
scientific issues in dispute, pretrial hearings where potential experts are subject to examination
by the court, and the appointment of special masters and specially trained law clerks.” (citation
omitted)).
256. Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2286 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id.
(discussing various potential flaws in the data on which the majority relied and concluding that
“[the Court’s] statistical analysis in [Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)
(2006),] cases is untested judicial factfinding masquerading as statutory interpretation”).
Notwithstanding Justice Scalia’s pointed criticism of the majority in Sykes, he often cites amicus
briefs and other extra-record materials to support factual claims in his own opinions. See, e.g.,
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2736–41 (2011) (citing amicus briefs filed by the
Cato Institute and the Comic Book Legal Defense Fund and a 1955 Harvard Law Review note).
257. Often the presentation of legislative facts will require the testimony of experts with
specialized knowledge in the field; the admission of such expert testimony is governed by the
Federal Rules of Evidence, as well as by case law. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (“If scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the
testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to
the facts of the case.”); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–95 (1993)
(establishing the standard for assessing the admissibility of novel scientific evidence); see also
Lewis A. Kaplan, Experts in the Courthouse: Problems and Opportunities, 2006 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 247, 254 (“Even where we have full cross-examination of competing expert witnesses, we
are not always as capable as we would like to be in reaching reliable, reasoned decisions.”).
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have a much more significant impact on society as a whole. Moreover,
in the vast majority of cases, the appellate court’s word on the subject
will be the final one, given the limited scope of Supreme Court
258
review.
Some have argued that traditional adversarial testing may be less
valuable when legislative facts—as opposed to adjudicative facts—are
259
at issue, but even if that argument is right, it does not follow that
260
there should be no testing of legislative facts at all, as is often the
case when they come to the Court’s attention through amicus briefs.
To be sure, there will sometimes be competing claims in amicus
briefs, but that will not always be the case. Moreover, as previously
noted, page limitations make briefs an awkward mechanism for
addressing factual claims and expert testimony. After all, as much
space as it may take to explain a factual claim based on empirical
evidence, it will likely take even more to explain why that claim is
261
wrong and offer an alternative understanding. Thus, amicus practice
presents, at best, a limited and ad hoc opportunity for the
258. See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications of the
Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV.
1093, 1100 (1987) (“[T]he Justices have only 150 full opportunities yearly to carry out their
function. No one suggests this number could be increased very much. Given the steady, if not
explosive, growth of the Court’s potential docket, each of these 150 cases represents an
increasingly precious opportunity for the Court to perform its supervisory task.” (footnote
omitted)).
259. See, e.g., Cheng, supra note 189, at 1281 (“In the scientific evidence
context . . . . adversarialism may be ineffective or even counterproductive . . . .”); see also, e.g.,
Broz v. Schweiker, 677 F.2d 1351, 1357–58 (11th Cir. 1982) (“Trial procedure is best suited for
adjudicative facts because the best source of information about specific facts concerning the
individual parties is the parties themselves. Facts that concern scientific truths, sociological data,
and industry-wide practices, on the other hand, are not peculiarly within the knowledge of the
parties and are not of the type that generally would be aided by viewing the demeanor of
witnesses, by cross-examination, and other aspects of adversarial factual development.”),
vacated, 461 U.S. 952 (1983).
260. Professor Michael Saks seems to take the view that special procedures for the
examination of legislative facts are unnecessary because, even if courts’ treatment of legislative
facts is sometimes sloppy, the same is true of courts’ treatment of cases and statutes. See
Michael J. Saks, Judicial Attention to the Way the World Works, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1011, 1023–24
(1990) (“[The] complaint that courts are careless about the social inquiries they make is of a
different order than whether they should conduct such inquiries. . . . [This] complaint is no
different from a complaint that a court has indulged in a casual or careless reading of cases or
statutes.”). But this argument ignores the fact that judges are trained in the reading of cases and
statutes, even if they may often do so imperfectly. Judges have no special training for the type of
research that goes into determining legislative facts.
261. In any event, whatever discussion of factual claims might occur in amicus briefs, none
of those claims are subjected to the same sort of vigorous adversarial testing that ideally occurs
in the district court.
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presentation of adversarial ideas, not the structured opportunity for
give-and-take presented by the party-centered adversarial system.
The paradoxical result of the courts’ inattention to this tension is that
those facts that are most in need of meaningful testing are often least
262
likely to receive it. This lack of proper testing can affect not only the
quality of a court’s decision in any given case, but also the courts’
263
overall legitimacy.
C. Transparency
In the two preceding Sections, I have discussed how the courts’
inattention to the difference between legislative and adjudicative facts
can affect the courts’ decisionmaking. But that inattention affects not
only how courts make decisions, but also how they present their
decisions to the public and to other governmental actors. As a general
matter, the judicial process is often shrouded in mystery—a veritable
264
black box. The general public’s window into the process by which
265
courts resolve judicial disputes is often quite narrow. To be sure,
briefs are publicly available, and oral arguments sometimes are. But
266
deliberations are conducted outside public view, meaning that the
public often has little understanding of why a court made the decision
it did. This secrecy can give rise to a lack of understanding and to a

262. See Davis, supra note 183, at 940 (“When only the immediate parties are affected,
allocating the burden of producing legislative facts and holding against a party who fails to
sustain his burden is both customary and sound. But when the Court is making law that affects
the many, and especially when it holds legislation unconstitutional, nothing less than adequate
factual development can be acceptable.”).
263. Margolis, supra note 221, at 209 (“Consistent misuse of non-legal information can serve
to undermine a court’s legitimacy, the court may appear irrational, and its decisions may be
considered unpersuasive.”).
264. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE
L.J. 943, 976 (1987) (“[T]o a large extent, the [Court’s Fourth Amendment] balancing takes
place inside a black box. Of course, the hidden process raises the specter of the kind of judicial
decisionmaking that the Realists warned us about and that balancing promised to overcome.”
(footnote omitted)).
265. See, e.g., F. Dennis Hale, Court Decisions as Information Sources for Journalists: How
Journalists Can Better Cover Appellate Decisions, 23 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 111, 111–12
(2000) (discussing the difficulties of reporting on appellate courts and the importance of the
published opinion).
266. See Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The End of Law, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1,
47–48 (2004) (“Apart from the final opinion or the publication of briefs, oral argument is the
only public proceeding in the appellate process.”).
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lack of faith that judges’ decisions are motivated by proper
267
considerations.
The only meaningful counter to this secrecy is the judicial
opinion. As old as the courts themselves, judicial opinions are
supposed to be transparent in both their conclusions and their
reasoning. By explaining courts’ decisions to the public, they facilitate
268
public knowledge and public understanding of those decisions. As
two commentators note, “[P]ublishing an opinion can help ameliorate
legitimacy concerns. The opinion allows the judges to explain their
269
reasoning.” Moreover, the judicial opinion can “advance[] the goal
of judicial constraint . . . by limiting idiosyncratic or ideological
270
decisionmaking.” In the absence of the explanation judicial opinions
provide, judicial decisions, particularly controversial ones, might find
271
less acceptance by the public. Judicial opinions also enable other
governmental actors, such as Congress, to respond more effectively to
272
the Court’s decisions. But the courts’ failure to acknowledge that
267. This concern is not trivial because “public acceptance [of the Court’s decisions] is not
automatic and cannot be taken for granted.” STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY
WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW, at xiii (2010).
268. See Ryan Benjamin Witte, The Judge as Author/The Author as Judge, 40 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 37, 40 (2009) (“The last audience of judicial opinions is the general public.
Although the general populace rarely reads more of court opinions than the quotes they gather
from the newspaper, it is nonetheless important that judges keep the layperson in mind when
crafting their opinions.”); cf. Carl A. Auerbach, Essay, A Revival of Some Ancient Learning: A
Critique of Eisenberg’s The Nature of the Common Law, 75 MINN. L. REV. 539, 557 (1991)
(“Judicial decisions and opinions may educate the legislature and public and alter prevailing
notions of morality and policy.”).
269. Abramowicz & Colby, supra note 98, at 993–94.
270. Id. at 994; see also Richard A. Posner, Judges’ Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?),
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1421, 1447–48 (1995) (discussing how the writing of judicial opinions can
discipline thinking and make apparent the “[i]narticulable or even unconscious feelings and
impressions” that may be underlying a judge’s conclusions); Meighan A. Rowe, Protecting
Those Who Protect Others: The Implications of the State Bar Act on Attorneys’ Adjudication
Rights in Disciplinary Proceedings, 4 J. LEGAL ADVOC. & PRAC. 137, 153 (2002) (“It is this facet
of the written opinion, imposing a judicial standard of fairness by opening opinions for the
world to see, that is another fundamental brick in the wall of procedural due process . . . .”);
David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 737 (1987) (“A
requirement that judges give reasons for their decisions—grounds of decision that can be
debated, attacked, and defended—serves a vital function in constraining the judiciary’s exercise
of power.”).
271. See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, The Problem with the Courts: Black-Robed Bureaucracy, or
Collegiality Under Challenge?, 42 MD. L. REV. 766, 768 (1983) (“[T]he courts’ opinions should
contain reasoned explanations of their decisions to lend them legitimacy, permit public
evaluation, and impose a discipline on judges.”).
272. See, e.g., Lori Hausegger & Lawrence Baum, Inviting Congressional Action: A Study of
Supreme Court Motivations in Statutory Interpretation, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 162, 165, 178–81
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legislative decisions are informing their consideration of issues—and
their resolution of those issues—means that judicial opinions are not
actually giving an honest account of judges’ decisions.
Instead of acknowledging that their decisions are based on
factual premises, courts will instead subsume factual understandings
in statements about values. Because courts often obfuscate—
intentionally or not—what is really motivating their decisions, it is
difficult for both the public and other actors to understand a given
decision and respond to it. After all, if potential litigants and other
governmental actors do not understand that the courts’ decisions are
predicated on empirical understandings, they have no opportunity to
challenge such understandings in future litigation or in other
responses to the courts’ decisions. And if the true bases for a decision
are unclear, the public’s ability to meaningfully evaluate and debate
273
that decision will be impaired. Moreover, as I discuss in the next
Section, it may mean that determinations that are essentially
empirical—facts that can and should be revisited over time—become
embedded in the law as immutable statements of reality.
D. Factual Stare Decisis
Courts explain the reasoning underlying their decisions in
judicial opinions not only to inform the public, but also to inform
each other. Appellate courts are aided in reviewing lower court
decisions by the lower court’s explanation of why it reached the
274
decision that it did. And lower courts are aided in resolving new

(1999) (providing an empirical analysis of the Supreme Court decisions that invite Congress to
overturn the Court on questions of federal statutory interpretation); see also ROBERT A.
KATZMANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS 73 (1997) (noting that federal appellate judges sometimes
seek to bring issues to the attention of Congress); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Role of Dissenting
Opinions, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1, 6 (2010) (identifying an entire genre of dissents that were
intended “to attract immediate public attention and, thereby, to propel legislative change”).
273. Cf. Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, Circa 2004, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 959, 962
(2004) (“The Constitution of the United States originated within a system of ‘popular
constitutionalism.’ In this system, government officials were required to do their best to
interpret the Constitution while going about the daily business of governing, but their
interpretations were not authoritative and were instead subject to direct supervision and
correction by the superior authority of ‘the people themselves’ . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
274. See, e.g., Peter S. Menell, Matthew D. Powers & Steven C. Carlson, Patent Claim
Construction: A Modern Synthesis and Structured Framework, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 711,
818–19 (2010) (“[A district court resolving patent claims] should provide a detailed explanation
for the basis for its ruling. Although the Federal Circuit currently reviews claim construction
rulings de novo, it is more likely to defer to the trial court’s interpretation when the ruling is
detailed and is accompanied by a detailed record.”); Anne Louise Marshall, Note, How Do
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questions of law by the guidance higher courts have provided in the
275
course of resolving similar questions. Indeed, as a general matter,
lower courts are bound by higher court decisions when those
decisions’ holdings address the precise legal question before the lower
276
court. What is less clear is the extent to which lower courts are—or
should be—bound by higher courts’ factual findings. This question
has been, as previously noted, a source of significant dispute amongst
courts of appeals following the Supreme Court’s decision in
277
Carhart.
Whatever the law might require, lower courts will, as a practical
matter, often reflexively follow a statement by a higher court, even if
the statement is only dictum or a factual finding that perhaps ought
not be binding. As Professor Davis notes,
The reality seems to be that courts often go beyond the record for
disputable facts, and . . . one of the principal sources of such extrarecord facts is factual propositions of law that have been laid down
in earlier cases . . . . Whatever the theory about stare decisis may be,
the tendency of the courts to apply that principle to findings of fact
278
is a rather substantial one.

Federal Courts of Appeals Apply Booker Reasonableness Review After Gall?, 45 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1419, 1432 (2008) (“The most important part of the record for the appellate judges to
review is the district court’s explanation of why a sentence was imposed . . . .”).
275. See, e.g., Thomas Grey, Holmes’s Language of Judging—Some Philistine Remarks, 70
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 5, 6 (1996) (“[T]he immediate practical point of accompanying appellate
judgments with opinions is to provide guidance to lower court judges and to lawyers counseling
clients”); Nancy A. Wanderer, Writing Better Opinions: Communicating with Candor, Clarity,
and Style, 54 ME. L. REV. 47, 53 (2002) (“Others have noted that appellate judges must address
opinions to both lower and higher courts, ‘lawyers seeking understanding and guidance,’ other
members of the judicial panel, ‘judges in other jurisdictions, legislative and executive officials,
scholars, and the community at large,’ any of whom might plan future transactions based on the
courts’ opinions.” (quoting Michael Wells, French and American Judicial Opinions, 19 YALE J.
INT’L L. 81, 87 (1994))).
276. Erwin Chemerinsky, Decision-Makers: In Defense of Courts, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 109,
128 (1997) (noting that, because of “[p]rinciples of stare decisis,” once a “question is decided in
an appellate court, . . . lower courts are then responsible for following that decision”).
277. See supra notes 209–215 and accompanying text.
278. Davis, Judicial Notice, supra note 162, at 970; see also Keeton, supra note 163, at 26
(“[A legislative fact] decision has force analogous to that of the decision of law for which it
served as a [legislative] fact . . . . [I]t is not subject to challenge except as part of the challenge to
the precedent for which it served as a premise. A contention that its factual premises are false
cannot evade the precedent. Rather, one may assert the falsity of the premises in support of the
contention that a court should overrule the precedent.”).
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Indeed, in the aftermath of Citizens United, numerous courts have
treated as gospel the Court’s factual claim that independent
279
expenditures do not result in corruption.
Even under ideal circumstances, there would be something
troubling about the perpetuation of court decisions based on factual
280
findings that have outlived their time and merit reexamination. It is
particularly troubling when one remembers that the original factual
findings may have been based on virtually no evidence at all and
whether they were based on evidence may have been due in large
part to chance—that is, whether the particular parties that brought
the first case raising those factual issues litigated the case well. To be
sure, Supreme Court rulings can be overruled, but overruling occurs
281
only in limited circumstances. It is unclear why factual findings
should be held to such a high standard. It may be beneficial for legal
precedents to enjoy a certain stability, but it is unclear why factual
findings should be equally stable when the world they are describing
may not be, and when new research inevitably provides a better and
282
Moreover, this
more precise understanding of the world.
279. See, e.g., SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 694–95 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (“In light
of the Court’s holding as a matter of law that independent expenditures do not corrupt or create
the appearance of quid pro quo corruption, contributions to groups that make only independent
expenditures also cannot corrupt or create the appearance of corruption. The Court has
effectively held that there is no corrupting ‘quid’ for which a candidate might in exchange offer
a corrupt ‘quo.’”), cert. denied sub nom. Keating v. FEC, 131 S. Ct. 553 (2010); see also Long
Beach Area Chamber of Commerce v. City of Long Beach, 603 F.3d 684, 695 (9th Cir. 2010)
(“Supreme Court precedent forecloses the City’s argument that independent expenditures by
independent expenditure committees (‘IECs’), like the Chamber PACs, raise the specter of
corruption or the appearance thereof.”); Republican Nat’l Comm. v. FEC, 698 F. Supp. 2d 150,
158 (D.D.C.) (“To the extent the FEC argues that large contributions to the national parties are
corrupting and can be limited because they create gratitude, facilitate access, or generate
influence, Citizens United makes clear that those theories are not viable.”), aff’d mem., 130 S.
Ct. 3544 (2010). But see Long Beach, 603 F.3d at 695 (“[T]he City’s broadly based anticorruption rationale for restricting contributions to IECs is lacking in legal and factual support
because the City has not offered sufficient evidence of corruption to support its asserted
governmental interest in restricting contributions to IECs.”).
280. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992) (noting that it
may be appropriate to overrule an earlier precedent when “facts have so changed, or come to be
seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification”).
281. See id. at 854–55 (discussing the circumstances under which a Supreme Court decision
may be overruled).
282. See, e.g., id. at 860 (“We have seen how time has overtaken some of Roe’s factual
assumptions: advances in maternal health care allow for abortions safe to the mother later in
pregnancy than was true in 1973, and advances in neonatal care have advanced viability to a
point somewhat earlier.” (citation omitted)). Even commentators who have argued that trial
courts should treat social science research the same way they treat case precedent, e.g., John
Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social
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entrenchment can pose real problems for subsequent litigants
bringing a claim that turns on the same facts. Such litigants end up
virtually bound by the prior court’s factual findings, even though they
had no opportunity to present evidence regarding those findings. At a
minimum, whatever the appropriate precedential effect of legislative
factfindings may be, it should be the result of a considered decision. It
should not become a matter of course simply as a result of an
unreflective conflation of facts and law.
E. More Fundamental Questions
Most fundamentally, the fact that there has been so little
attention paid to the distinction between adjudicative and legislative
facts raises the question whether the U.S. legal system, which is
primarily designed to address adjudicative facts, should be modified
to take more explicit account of the existence of legislative facts and
the critical role that they play in establishing the nation’s legal rules.
It also raises the question whether the U.S. legal system should
continue to view itself as focused almost entirely on narrow
adversarial disputes when some of the most consequential cases the
courts resolve are not conflicts between two opposing parties, but
283
between two opposing ideas about the law or public policy.
Consider the litigation challenging the constitutionality of the
healthcare-reform legislation. By early 2011, at least thirteen suits had
284
been filed in nearly as many districts. The plaintiffs in these suits are
not prototypical plaintiffs who have suffered some particularized or
285
personal injury; indeed, some are state attorneys general. And the
courts considering these challenges are hearing virtually no facts that
Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 478 (1986), have acknowledged that “a lower court
should be able to reach empirical conclusions that differ from those of an appellate court when
it has obtained new research not previously before the reviewing court,” id. at 516. Of course, it
is unclear how exactly this would work. Courts adopting legislative facts rarely go into depth
about all of the sources that they have considered in adopting that position, so it is unclear how
lower courts would know when they have considered new research that was not previously
reviewed by the appellate court.
283. Cf. Davis, supra note 47, at 6 (“Legislators have no problem about considering the way
a policy may affect a nonparty; judges usually focus mainly on parties, even when a decision may
vitally affect nonparties.”).
284. For a good overview of the current status of the various suits challenging the healthcare
reform legislation, see ACA LITIG. BLOG, http://acalitigationblog.blogspot.com (last updated
Sept. 2, 2011, 5:12 PM).
285. E.g., Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Nos. 1111021 & 11-11067, 2011 WL 3519178 (11th Cir. Aug. 12, 2011); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v.
Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010).
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are unique to the particular parties before them; instead, they are all
considering essentially the same legislative fact questions about the
effect of uninsured persons on the healthcare market and the effect of
286
the healthcare market on the larger economy. There is arguably
something odd about different judges in different parts of the country
all considering the same factual questions—and reaching different
answers. To be sure, judges often reach different answers to the same
questions, but generally those questions are legal rather than factual.
There is a considerable difference, and even some oddity, in courts’
efforts to answer these factual questions—key questions on which the
constitutionality of this important legislation will inevitably turn—
without as many resources as possible.
I do not mean to suggest that there is necessarily anything wrong
with courts hearing these cases, although whether the plaintiffs have
standing under traditional standing doctrine is a close question at
287
best. But even if it is desirable for courts to hear these cases, it does
not follow that this is the ideal way for the courts to hear them. The
procedures these courts are using would make sense if the courts
were resolving cases that turned primarily on adjudicative facts. The
question is simply whether they make as much sense when the cases
turn on legislative facts.
Perhaps the parties in these cases will be able to present the
courts with all of the information that they need, but there are
certainly many other interested organizations and individuals that will
be just as affected by the courts’ decisions and that will have just as
much access, if not more, to the relevant facts. When these cases go
up on appeal, those groups may offer the appellate courts their own
factual claims. But at that point, those claims will be subject to little, if
any, adversarial testing, in part because the U.S. legal system—so sure
that factual development is confined to parties before the trial

286. See, e.g., Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, No. 10-2388, 2011 WL 2556039, at *12 (6th
Cir. June 29, 2011) (“Congress had a rational basis to believe that the practice of self-insuring
for the cost of health care, in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.”); see also
Florida, 2011 WL 3519178, at *61 (concluding that the individual mandate exceeds Congress’s
authority under the Commerce Clause); Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 775–82 (finding that the
Minimum Essential Coverage Provision exceeds the scope of Congress’s historical Commerce
Clause power and therefore cannot be justified under the Necessary and Proper Clause).
287. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Professors of Federal Jurisdiction in Support of
Appellant, Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, No. 11-1057 (4th Cir. Mar. 7, 2011) (arguing
that the plaintiffs lack Article III standing); cf. Kevin C. Walsh, The Ghost That Slew the
Mandate, 64 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (arguing that the district court in Sebelius lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to declare the healthcare reform unconstitutional).
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court—has developed no methods for testing facts that do not enter
the case in that way. They will, in other words, have fallen victim to
the adversarial myth.
The adversarial myth suggests that all of the factual disputes
being resolved in the nation’s courts are being subject to rigorous
adversarial testing, and that suitable procedures are in place to deal
with all of the cases in the nation’s court system, those that turn on
adjudicative and legislative facts alike. But the myth is maintained
only by ignoring the extent to which courts regularly disregard those
practices and procedures. This tension between the myth and the
reality teaches an important lesson: if courts are not content to rely
on traditional adversarialism, there is likely a reason. Court practices
and procedures may need to be modified to ensure that all facts, not
just adjudicative ones, are rigorously tested before they become the
basis for legally binding rules. In the next Part, I offer some
preliminary thoughts on how to address this problem.
V. SOME THOUGHTS ON MOVING FORWARD
Having recognized the existence of the adversarial myth—and
the numerous consequences that follow from it—the question
remains how best to address those consequences. I offer some
preliminary thoughts on larger solutions—ideas to restructure the
nation’s legal system to take account of the reality that not all facts
are created equal, and that the current system is designed to resolve
disputes that turn on adjudicative facts, not legislative facts. But
recognizing that such large-scale changes may not be imminent, I also
offer some thoughts on steps judges can take in the meantime to
address the problems created by the tension between the adversarial
myth and the legal system’s quasi-adversarial reality. In the end, all of
the solutions I suggest rest on recognizing the difference between
adjudicative and legislative facts, which, in turn, helps identify both
where the nation’s adversarial system is more myth than reality and
how to address the problem.
A. Larger Solutions
As I discussed in the preceding Parts, the U.S. legal system has
long struggled—albeit quietly—with its multiplicity of roles. The
system has at once resolved narrow disputes that will affect only the
parties before the court and more general disputes that will have far
more significant consequences for society as a whole. The U.S. legal
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system was designed to address the former, and is not necessarily well
suited to addressing the latter. It is perhaps worth considering, then,
whether the myth that the current system is ensuring adequate testing
of all of the disputes that come before the courts should be
abandoned and replaced with an alternative model that employs
different practices and procedures when legislative facts are at issue.
As an initial matter, the courts’ liberal acceptance and use of
extra-record facts is an implicit recognition that adverseness is not
sufficient to ensure that courts are provided with all of the facts they
need to resolve cases. This, then, calls into question one of the
primary assumptions on which standing doctrine is premised—the
notion that adverseness will sharpen the presentation of issues to the
court and thereby improve judicial decisionmaking. Indeed, as one
commentator has argued, if “the concrete-adversity test is meant to
guarantee . . . the best advocacy . . . standing doctrine does not
288
provide that guarantee.” Others have also questioned the
assumption that standing doctrine ensures higher-quality advocacy.
Given that the plaintiff with the injury will not actually be the person
arguing the case, there is reason to question whether the
particularized nature of his injury will actually affect the quality of the
289
advocacy. Moreover, “the willingness of a plaintiff voluntarily to
undergo the expense and inconvenience of litigation should itself
290
provide adequate assurance of vigorous advocacy.” Indeed, there is
reason to think that “the quality of advocacy in public actions, where
interest groups competently assert their own special interests, is
higher than the quality of advocacy in the average private suit, in
which the plaintiff satisfies traditional requirements of particularized
291
injury.”
This discussion suggests that courts should be more open to
hearing disputes even when the plaintiff does not have the
particularized injury that is the sine qua non of contemporary
standing doctrine. After all, although there may be multiple
292
justifications for standing doctrine,
the need for adverse
288. Elliott, supra note 64, at 474.
289. Girardeau A. Spann, Expository Justice, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 585, 650–51 (1983); cf.
Healy, supra note 45, at 914 (“[E]ven supporters of public interest litigation do not question the
need for an adversarial presentation of the issues. They question only the Court’s insistence that
the presentation be made by parties with a personal stake in the dispute.” (footnote omitted)).
290. Spann, supra note 289, at 650.
291. Id. at 651.
292. See supra notes 64–78 and accompanying text.
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presentation of the issues by the parties is frequently invoked. If
attention to the practice of appellate courts reveals that standing
doctrine is unable to fulfill—and arguably undermines—one of its
primary responsibilities, other traditional justifications for standing
doctrine must be examined to determine whether they also fall away
under scrutiny. Litigants and cases should not be denied entry into
the court system based on a doctrine that does not actually serve the
purposes it was designed to serve.
Moreover, allowing those actors who do not satisfy standing
doctrine’s traditional injury requirement to become parties may help
ensure better development of the factual record before the trial court.
To be sure, nonparties can, and often do, introduce factual evidence
through amicus briefs, but as I have previously discussed, such factual
evidence is generally introduced in the appellate courts in a way that
allows it to escape the rigors of adversarial testing. It would be far
better to bring those organizations and individuals with relevant facts
into the process at the trial court stage, when the information they
have to offer can be subjected to some form of scrutiny and testing. In
that way, the trial court can have a meaningful opportunity to be the
first real factfinder—as it is supposed to be—and the appellate court
can look to the record the trial court developed for all of the facts that
are relevant to the case.
To be sure, the requirement of standing is now very much
entrenched in the law, and the Court has offered justifications for it
294
beyond the need for adversity. But it is worth remembering that
standing is, in the view of many, a court-conceived doctrine.
According to one commentator, the “constitutional bar to strangers
as complainants against unconstitutional action . . . [is] without
foundation” and exists, at least in part, because of “the mistaken
assumption that the practice in such strictly private actions as tort and
295
contract governed ‘public actions’ as well.” As I have argued
293. See supra notes 71–76 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text.
295. Berger, supra note 52, at 827; see also Winter, supra note 52, at 1374 (“[A] painstaking
search of the historical material demonstrates that—for the first 150 years of the Republic—the
Framers, the first Congresses, and the Court were oblivious to the modern conception either
that standing is a component of the constitutional phrase ‘cases or controversies’ or that it is a
prerequisite for seeking governmental compliance with the law.”); cf. Elizabeth Magill, Standing
for the Public: A Lost History, 95 VA. L. REV. 1131, 1139 (2009) (arguing that the Supreme
Court used to “embrace[] a different approach to standing,” one that “allowed Congress to
authorize challenges to administrative action by those who did not have legal rights” so they
could “raise the rights of the public”).
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throughout, appellate courts’ failure to truly come to terms with the
duality of their roles has meant that rules and practices designed for
one type of case—private disputes involving adjudicative facts—have
been awkwardly applied to a fundamentally different type of case—
296
public disputes involving legislative facts.
Moreover, if the need for adversity is not doing any meaningful
work in the Court’s standing analysis, it would be better if the Court
stopped pretending otherwise. The Court’s frequent invocation of
adversity as a justification for standing limitations helps obscure the
fact that the courts often do not rely on adverse parties for factual
development. As I discussed in the prior Part, the courts’ failure to
recognize their reliance on extra-record factfinding is in many
respects even more problematic than the fact that it occurs. Once the
appellate courts’ practice of looking beyond the parties for factual
development is acknowledged, procedures can be developed to
ensure that those extra-record facts are meaningfully tested. Indeed,
although the courts’ frequent resort to extra-record factfinding raises
one reason to rethink traditional standing limitations, bringing more
parties into the process earlier does not necessarily require
liberalizing standing requirements; an alternative—and easier—initial
step might be to liberalize the rules for intervention in cases in which
traditional standing has been established by defining broadly who has
297
an “interest” in litigation.
In addition to opening the door to more parties, the courts could
also play a more active role in determining which counsel will bear
primary responsibility for litigating a case. Such an active role for the
courts would not be wholly foreign even in the United States’
adversarial system. In class actions, for example, courts have the
296. Cf. Mary M. Cheh, When Congress Commands a Thing To Be Done: An Essay on
Marbury v. Madison, Executive Inaction, and the Duty of the Courts To Enforce the Law, 72
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 253, 281 (2003) (“[T]he private law model . . . dominated the world of
Marbury v. Madison; a model that made sense then, but does not fairly represent the world we
inhabit today.”).
297. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24 (rule for intervention); see also Susan Bandes, The Idea of a
Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 251 (1990) (noting “the range of interests which have been required
for intervention” under Rule 24); Christopher J. Peters, Adjudication as Representation, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 312, 418 & n.372 (1997) (“Joinder and intervention should be liberally
permitted.”); Juliet Johnson Karastelev, Note, On the Outside Seeking In: Must Intervenors
Demonstrate Standing To Join a Lawsuit?, 52 DUKE L.J. 455, 455–56 (2002) (“By allowing
nonparties to intervene, Rule 24 lets them represent their interests and arguably improves the
court’s decisionmaking by allowing the presentation of different viewpoints and evidence.
Courts may also benefit from granting motions to intervene, because by including intervenors
up front, they may be spared relitigation of the same issue.” (footnote omitted)).
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authority to appoint “class counsel” and are supposed to consider,
among other things, the potential counsel’s resources and experience,
as well as “any other matter pertinent to counsel’s ability to fairly and
298
adequately represent the interests of the class.” And the Supreme
Court regularly appoints counsel to “support an undefended
299
judgment below, or to take a specific position as an amicus.”
Courts should also consider what procedures are most
300
appropriate for resolution of disputes about legislative facts. Courts
and commentators alike have, at various times, suggested that
adversarial, trial-type hearings are not the best method for resolving
301
such disputes. That may well be right. My point in this Article is not
that adversarialism necessarily provides the best means of testing all
302
facts, but simply that the assumption that all of the factual findings
in appellate court opinions are currently being subjected to such
testing is a myth. And it is therefore necessary to think about what
processes should be put in place to ensure that factual findings are, in
fact, subjected to meaningful testing, whether adversarial or not.
Perhaps courts should turn to experts to help with the adjudication of
303
legislative facts, or perhaps there should be panels of judges who
304
specialize in the resolution of this particular type of factual dispute.
298. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g).
299. Goldman, supra note 3, at 907 (noting that this has happened forty-three times since
1954).
300. To be sure, it may be difficult to determine which facts need to be subjected to this
more rigorous testing. After all, there are any number of facts implicit in any judicial decision,
and it cannot be that all of them are susceptible to formal proof. See FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory
committee’s note (“[E]very case involves the use of hundreds or thousands of nonevidence
facts. . . . The judicial process cannot construct every case from scratch, like Descartes creating a
world based on the postulate Cogito, ergo sum.”); see also Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct.
2267, 2291 (2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (suggesting that an “intuition . . . consistent with
common sense and experience,” “even though unsupported by data,” could “be sufficient” to
justify the Court’s conclusion on an empirical question); Davis, Judicial Notice, supra note 162,
at 975 (“Every simple case involves the assumption of hundreds of facts that have not been
proved.”). How to distinguish those facts that require meaningful testing from those that do not
is a subject I hope to take up in a future Article.
301. See, e.g., supra note 198.
302. Even if adversarialism is not always the best means of testing factual findings, it is
important to consider whether due process concerns require providing some notice to parties
before legislative fact disputes are resolved through nonadversarial means. See Thornburg,
supra note 189, at 192–96 (discussing the due process concerns posed when judges engage in
factfinding by conducting their own independent research).
303. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 706(a) (“The court may on its own motion or on the motion of
any party enter an order to show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed, and may
request the parties to submit nominations.”).
304. See FED. R. CIV. P. 72–73 (establishing the rules applicable to magistrate judges).
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Perhaps there should be guidelines for a more active research process
305
on the part of judges. Perhaps there should be officials who
specialize in legislative factfinding to whom appellate judges can turn
306
for assistance, just as district court judges often turn to magistrates.
At least one commentator suggests that there should be a research
service for the Supreme Court to assist the Court in this regard.
Professor Davis proposes that the Court
formally ask Congress to explore the potential for creating a
research service to assist the Court. The sole purpose should be to
increase the Court’s freedom to obtain whatever research assistance
it decides it needs. The Court should have the privilege of asking for
research either on a problem about a pending case or about a
307
narrow or broad area of law.
308

Whatever the best procedures or guidelines might be, some
procedures or guidelines should exist so that judges—be they trial or
appellate—do not simply engage in the ad hoc cherry-picking of facts
out of amicus briefs, their bedtime reading, or their nightly news
program, and so that all litigants—parties and nonparties alike—

305. Even if such an active role for the judge might be inconsistent with traditional norms of
a judge’s role in an adversarial system, it would not be unprecedented for the judicial system to
“violate[] its own ideals of passivity and party control in the name of better decisionmaking.”
Cheng, supra note 189, at 1283; see also Goldman, supra note 3, at 971 (noting that the Court’s
“commit[ment] . . . to the goal of judicial restraint that the adversary system promotes” is “weak
when the Court is presented with a vehicle to address a question of great interest”).
306. See, e.g., David C. Vladeck & Mitu Gulati, Judicial Triage: Reflections on the Debate
over Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1667, 1699 (2005) (asking whether “the
burdens on appellate courts [have] reached the point where Congress should consider the
creation of a permanent corps of professional assistants to Article III court of appeals judges”
and noting that “[s]uch assistants could fill a role modeled on that of the magistrate judge in
district court litigation”).
307. Davis, supra note 47, at 17. Of course, the Supreme Court currently has at its disposal
the assistance of the excellent research staff of the Supreme Court library. See, e.g., Philip P.
Frickey, Transcending Transcendental Nonsense: Toward a New Realism in Federal Indian Law,
38 CONN. L. REV. 649, 665 (2006) (“When I was a clerk, in 1979–80, our best research tools were
the excellent research librarians of the Supreme Court library. If asked by my justice, Thurgood
Marshall, to find out all I could about tribal courts—a subject about which I knew nothing—I
would have turned over the inquiry to one of them. In a few days, I would have received
whatever she or he could locate in the Supreme Court library, the Library of Congress, and
wherever else materials could be found.”). The goal of a research service would be to make such
assistance more formalized and more transparent.
308. See Margolis, supra note 221, at 205 (summarizing briefly past proposals to address the
problem). It may well also be that different procedures or rules should apply depending on the
type of legislative fact or the use to which it will be put in the court’s analysis. Id. at 215.
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know what sorts of information they can submit to the court and at
309
what stage.
Finally, if courts should employ special procedures to resolve
disputes involving legislative facts, it is worth considering whether all
cases that turn primarily on the same legislative facts should be
consolidated in one court, rather than adjudicated in many different
310
district courts across the country. It will not always be easy, of
course, to readily identify those cases in which legislative facts are
dispositive. But in many cases it will be easy to make that
determination, either because no adjudicative facts are relevant or
because the parties can stipulate to any relevant adjudicative facts. Or
it might be possible to bifurcate cases—with traditional district courts
resolving the adjudicative facts—before the cases are consolidated in
a single court that will resolve any legislative fact disputes. This sort
of consolidation would not only facilitate the concentration of
investigative resources, but would also avoid the awkwardness of
311
different courts resolving factual disputes in different ways. It could
also, although it need not, facilitate some degree of judicial
specialization, allowing judges with expertise in particular areas to
312
hear cases in the relevant fields. The possibility of courts engaging
309. Id. at 200 (arguing that “lawyers [have not made] effective use of non-legal materials in
support of policy arguments in briefs” because, in part, “many attorneys believed they could not
put factual information in their briefs if it had not been placed in evidence at trial”).
310. There is, in fact, already a statute that provides for the consolidation or coordination of
pretrial proceedings when “civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are
pending in different districts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 42 (rule for
consolidation). This multidistrict litigation statute may have lessons to teach about how courts
could bifurcate cases to help address legislative facts. For more on consolidation in the federal
courts, see generally Richard L. Marcus, Confronting the Consolidation Conundrum, 1995
B.Y.U. L. REV. 879; and Judith Resnik, Aggregation, Settlement, and Dismay, 80 CORNELL L.
REV. 918 (1995).
311. See, e.g., A Woman’s Choice–E. Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684, 688
(7th Cir. 2002) (“[I]t is unsound to say that, on records very similar in nature, [one state’s] law
could be valid . . . and [another’s] invalid, just because different district judges reached different
conclusions about the inferences to be drawn from the same body of statistical work.”); Hope
Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 883 (7th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (Posner, J., dissenting), vacated, 530
U.S. 1271 (2000) (“[T]he constitutional right of abortion cannot be made to depend on whether
a particular district judge finds a particular physician who disagrees with the consensus of
medical opinion to be more credible than the spokesmen for the consensus.”). But see Saks,
supra note 260, at 1013 (“Discovering that various courts make findings or announce holdings in
contradictory directions is only to discover . . . what the early legal realists discovered about
contracts, torts, and every other area of law.”).
312. The prospect of specialized courts has, of course, long been the subject of controversy.
See, e.g., Edward K. Cheng, The Myth of the Generalist Judge, 61 STAN. L. REV. 519, 520–21
(2008) (“Federal circuit judges, for example, frequently comment on the importance and
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in the type of factual development typically undertaken by
legislatures may give a reader some pause. But to the extent that
engaging in that type of factual development is a fundamental part of
the enterprise of judging, it is better that it be done in the open.
I do not mean to suggest that specialized courts of this nature are
necessarily the right solution. Indeed, there would surely be
downsides to such an approach. All I mean to do at this point is to
identify the tensions in the existing system and to begin a
conversation about the problems caused by those tensions, as well as
possible solutions. If there is a big problem, it makes sense to think
big about ways to address it.
B. In the Meantime . . . What Judges Can Do
That said, it takes time to implement big solutions. In the
meantime, there are smaller and simpler steps that appellate judges
can take when they are confronted with an inadequate factual record
from the trial court below. First, one simple but significant step would
313
be for appellate courts to remand the case to the trial court. Trial
courts may not be the perfect forums for resolving legislative fact
disputes, but at present they are the only judicial bodies with formal
experience making factual findings. Trial courts can hold hearings
specifically on a legislative fact question with witnesses able to speak
to the issue. Trial courts can encourage back-and-forth between

desirability of being a generalist and acknowledge the generalist’s iconic status in the American
legal tradition.” (footnote omitted)); S. Jay Plager, The United States Courts of Appeals, the
Federal Circuit, and the Non-Regional Subject Matter Concept: Reflections on the Search for a
Model, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 853, 866–67 (1990) (proposing a study of the Federal Circuit to help
assess the effects of specialized courts); Sarang Vijay Damle, Note, Specialize the Judge, Not the
Court: A Lesson from the German Constitutional Court, 91 VA. L. REV. 1267, 1269 (2005)
(proposing an “alternative path to judicial specialization” modeled on the Federal
Constitutional Court of Germany).
313. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 668 (1994) (“Because of the
unresolved factual questions, the importance of the issues . . . , and the conflicting conclusions
that the parties contend are to be drawn from the statistics and other evidence presented, we
think it necessary to permit the parties to develop a more thorough factual record, and to allow
the District Court to resolve any factual disputes remaining, before passing upon the
constitutional validity of the challenged provisions.”); see also Alfange, supra note 165, at 668
(“Where an adequate trial of the facts is not held, however, and the appellate courts find it
necessary to be more fully informed on factual questions, a remand to the lower court for a
more thorough trial would be entirely in order.”); Miller & Barron, supra note 41, at 1233–36
(suggesting that the Supreme Court should sometimes “remand the issue of the taking of
judicial notice of a particular issue of legislative fact to the trial court”).
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parties and direct them to respond to specific claims and arguments.
And a trial court facing a remand from an appellate court to address a
legislative fact question can encourage amicus participation and make
sure that the opposing parties—and opposing amici—have ample
315
opportunity to respond to each other’s factual claims. By adopting
these practices, trial courts can subject legislative facts to far more
rigorous testing than the current system provides.
When remand is not possible because time pressures require
316
faster resolution of a case, there may be circumstances in which it is
not altogether inappropriate for the court to look at the factual
records developed by other courts, as the Court did in Citizens
317
United. But there are important caveats to this suggestion. First, the
318
court must ensure—as it failed to do in Citizens United —that the
relevant issue was actually in play in the prior litigation and was
contested by the parties before that court. Second, if it was in play
and contested, the court should give meaningful notice to the parties
that it intends to use facts from an outside record and should give
them at least some opportunity to respond, even if only by filing
simultaneous letter briefs.
Another small step would be for courts to spell out, as the district
319
court did in the Proposition 8 case, the factual findings that are the
320
basis for their decisions. As I discussed earlier, a significant problem
314. To be sure, appellate courts, like trial courts, could request supplemental briefing or
schedule reargument on a specific question, but such departures from general practice occur
much more frequently at the trial level than at the appellate level.
315. Even if amicus participation at the trial court level is currently rare, see supra notes 84–
87 and accompanying text, there is no prohibition against it and thus no reason why district
court judges cannot encourage it.
316. Time pressures may exist because of external circumstances surrounding the case or
because the statute at issue itself requires expedited review. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 403(a)(4), 116 Stat. 81, 113–14 (“It shall be the duty of the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia and the Supreme Court of the United
States to advance on the docket and to expedite to the greatest possible extent the disposition of
the action and appeal.”).
317. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
318. See supra note 120.
319. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 953–91 (N.D. Cal. 2010), appeal pending,
No. 10-16696, 2010 WL 3212786 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2010).
320. Indeed, it might be helpful if district courts also make clear when they think the
lawyers’ presentations were weak, thus signaling to appellate courts that they did not have
before them all of the evidence they needed to properly adjudicate the factual disputes. Thus, in
such cases, if legislative facts end up being dispositive, the appellate court could remand to the
trial court, which could then encourage better factual development by inviting amicus
participation.
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with the adversarial myth is the way in which it hides the distinction
between adjudicative facts and legislative facts—and thus causes the
relevance of legislative facts to be ignored in judicial decisionmaking.
If courts were forced to identify expressly the legislative facts on
which they have relied, it might increase the likelihood that judges
would not rest their decisions on unfounded assumptions but instead
would subject their assumptions to further research and testing,
whatever form that further research and testing might take.
Furthermore, that small step would contribute significantly to the
transparency of the courts’ decisions and would enable the public and
other governmental actors to understand why the court did what it
did. To the extent the court’s decision rested on factual premises that
may be contestable, it would give others an opportunity to try to
gather more empirical evidence to contest those factual findings. As
Professor Davis notes, “[T]he difference between appearing to stay
within the record and frankly acknowledging resort to extra-record
sources for legislative facts is usually only a difference in the degree
321
of articulation of the grounds for decision.” Greater transparency in
court decisions will thus make it more evident when courts are relying
on extra-record facts.
CONCLUSION
At the outset, I observed that the most dangerous myths are
those that are grounded in reality. They are the ones that most easily
inculcate belief in the myth and prevent discovery of its
imperfections. The adversarial myth is such a pervasive part of the
U.S. legal system that it is easy to ignore its imperfections—to write
them off as inconsequential and trivial. But some of these
imperfections and tensions should not be so easily ignored: they
reveal true weaknesses in the way appellate courts address legislative
facts.
In this Article, I have argued that one respect in which the
commitment to adversarialism is more myth than reality is appellate
court extra-record factfinding—appellate courts’ practice of looking
outside the record created by the parties before the trial court and
finding their own facts. As I have demonstrated, this practice occurs
frequently, particularly at the Supreme Court, and particularly in
cases raising significant legal issues with the potential for widespread

321. Davis, Judicial Notice, supra note 162, at 953.
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impact. Future research could explore empirically just how often
extra-record factfinding occurs, particularly in the courts of appeals,
and whether it occurs particularly often in specific types of cases or in
cases involving specific types of parties.
I have also argued that the distinction between adjudicative
facts—party-specific facts—and legislative facts—general facts—helps
explain why this extra-record factfinding so often occurs. The United
States’ adversarial system and the practices and rules that go along
with it were adopted for cases that turn primarily on adjudicative
facts. They prove far less useful in cases that turn primarily on
legislative facts, even though such cases make up a significant amount
of the work done by the federal courts. Again, further empirical
investigation into the practice of appellate court extra-record
factfinding—particularly a historical examination of the practice—
could help elucidate the causes of the practice, including the extent to
which it has become more prevalent as a result of changes in the
nature of litigation and technological innovation.
But the causes of the practice are in some sense less important
than its consequences. Although I have posited several troubling
consequences that result from appellate court extra-record
factfinding—and the little-considered way in which it currently
occurs—there is more room for research. It would be helpful to have
a richer understanding of how the extra-record nature of appellate
court factfinding affects the quality of the courts’ factual findings.
Indeed, although I have assumed that adversarial testing tends to
produce more accurate factual findings, a sample of cases in which
courts have engaged in less adversarial-driven factfinding would
provide an opportunity to test that premise. And it would be helpful
to have a richer understanding of how this practice affects the way
appellate court decisions are understood by the public, by the other
branches, and by subsequent courts.
Understanding these consequences, of course, is merely a
precursor to identifying appropriate solutions. Identifying what
consequences follow—and follow most significantly and frequently—
from the practice of appellate court extra-record factfinding will make
it possible to identify the most promising potential solutions. I have
provided some preliminary thoughts on possible solutions here, but
there is much work that remains to be done, both in determining
whether those solutions will effectively address the consequences of
the practice and in ascertaining what other effects those solutions
might have on the legal system.
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This is important work, and it requires recognizing that appellate
court extra-record factfinding is one respect in which the nation’s
commitment to adversarialism is more myth than reality. To
recognize this imperfection in the adversarial system is not to destroy
it. To the contrary, by recognizing the system’s limitations, it becomes
possible to begin a conversation about how to address them and, in
the end, make the nation’s legal system stronger.

